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DO IT IN THE SUNSHINE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
OF RULEMAKING PROCEDURES AND TRANSPARENCY
PRACTICES OF LAWYER-LICENSING ENTITIES
Bobbi Jo Boyd

INTRODUCTION
Regulation of occupational licensing has garnered national
attention. 1 During the last sixty years, the number of occupations
regulated by governmental entities has notably increased. 2 As the
number of regulated occupations increases, employment
opportunities and wages for individuals who cannot afford or
otherwise meet licensing requirements decrease. 3
In addition to concerns linked to the growing number of
occupations requiring licensure, private 4 and governmental 5
1. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY OFFICE OF ECON. POLICY, THE COUNCIL OF ECON.
ADVISERS, & THE DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK FOR
POLICYMAKERS 3, 6, 17, (2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov /sites /default /files
/docs/licensing_report_final_nonembargo.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DGS-FNCL] [hereinafter
OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICYMAKERS].
2. Since the 1950s, states have increasingly assumed responsibility for regulating
professions practiced within their borders. See Morris M. Kleiner & Alan B. Krueger,
Analyzing the Extent and Influence of Occupational Licensing on the Labor Market, 31 J.
LAB. ECON. S173, S175-S176 (2013). Between 1952 and 2008, the number of recorded
occupations requiring a license leapt from less than 5% to 29%. See id. at S176.
3. See OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICYMAKERS, supra note
1, at 4; see also Ryan Nunn, Occupational Licensing and American Workers 1, 4-5, 7, THE
HAMILTON PROJECT (June 21, 2016), http://www.hamiltonproject.org /assets /files
/occupational_licensing_and_american_workers.pdf [https://perma.cc/27VL-2PR8] (noting
that both wages and employment opportunities decrease for those without occupational
licenses).
4. See, e.g., Morris M. Kleiner, Reforming Occupational Licensing Policies 11, 1617, THE HAMILTON PROJECT (Jan. 2015), http://www.hamiltonproject.org/
assets/legacy/files/downloads_and_links/reforming_occupational_licensing_morris_kleiner
_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/XFJ6-GQ8Y].
5. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. ASSEMB., PROGRAM EVAL. DIV., OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING
AGENCIES SHOULD NOT BE CENTRALIZED, BUT STRONGER OVERSIGHT IS NEEDED 1, 1521, (2014), http://www.ncleg.net/PED/Reports/documents/OccLic/OccLic_Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YK4Z-WVF9] (concluding North Carolina’s occupational licensing
agencies need stronger oversight).
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organizations alike have raised concerns about adequate oversight
of state occupational licensing entities, 6 even for occupations that
have been regulated for a century. 7 Agency operations that result
in anti-competitive 8 or discriminatory effects 9 serve as two
reasons why there is concern that oversight of occupational
licensing entities is inadequate.
Occupational licensing entities have responded to these
concerns by initiating rulemaking procedures to amend,
withdraw, or create new rules. 10 In addition to these concerns,
our globalized world and economy has prompted occupational
licensing entities to adapt traditional rules to new ways in which
professional services are delivered and regulated. 11 If changes to
6. See, e.g., Jon Sanders, Texas Occupational License Ruling Another Warning to
North Carolina, JOHN LOCKE FOUND. (Aug. 26, 2015), http://www.johnlocke.org /update
/texas- occupational- license -ruling -another -warning -to- north-carolina/ [https://perma.cc
/D3P9 - 3AXV].
7. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-22(a)-(b) (West 2017) (acknowledging the
North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners as an entity created in 1879 and affirming
the entity’s continued existence in 1935 “as the agency of the State for the regulation of the
practice of dentistry”), with N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1111
(2015) (denying sovereign immunity for want of active state supervision to members of the
North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners in antitrust litigation where a majority of
dental board members are private-market participants).
8. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1111.
9. See, e.g., Jenni Bergal, A License to Braid Hair? Critics Say State Licensing Rules
Have Gone Too Far, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Jan. 30, 2015),
http://www.pewtrusts.org /en /research-and-analysis /blogs /stateline /2015 /1 /30/a-licenseto-braid-hair-critics-say-state-licensing-rules-have-gone-too-far [https://perma.cc /8WVJ5RRJ] (critiquing jurisdiction’s regulations requiring African-style hair braiders to obtain
cosmetology license, which entails 1,500 hours of training, passing two exams, and paying
thousands of dollars in tuition costs to attend a cosmetology school that does not teach hair
braiding, despite the fact that hair braiding does not involve chemicals, nor cutting, dying,
or shampooing hair); Matt Powers, “Natural Hair Braiding Protection Act” Now Law in
Arkansas, INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE, http://ij.org/press-release/natural-hair-braidingprotection-act-now-law-in-arkansas/ [https://perma.cc/J42X-KG5M] (stating that the
Institute for Justice filed a lawsuit on behalf of two Arkansas hair braiders, Nivea Earl and
Christine McLean, but that, prior to the case being heard, the law was changed to exempt
hair braiders by mirroring legislation that the Institute for Justice supported); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 17-26-504 (Supp. 2017) (stating that natural hair braiders are generally exempt from
occupational regulation).
10. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 93B-8.1(b) (West 2017) (stating that
occupational licensing boards “shall not automatically deny licensure on the basis of an
applicant’s criminal history” and boards must consider a list of factors related to the
applicant’s criminal record before denying licensure on that basis).
11. See, e.g., Letter from Leigh I. Saufley, Chief Justice, Me. Supreme Judicial Court,
to Jennifer Archer, Chair, Me. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs (Jan. 25, 2017),
http://mainebarexaminers.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/UBE-adoption-notice-from-
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agency rules are likely, it makes sense to pay attention to the
processes by which occupational licensing entities use their
rulemaking authority and the extent to which that authority is
exercised in the sunshine. 12
Rulemaking procedures and transparency practices matter.
They matter because they obtain and perpetuate the democratic
ideal of meaningful participation in government. In the context
of administrative agencies, meaningful participation requires
agencies to provide avenues for public participation, access to
information about how to engage with the agency, and the ability
to observe agency operations. Typically, state occupational
licensing entities promulgate rules governing admission to a
particular profession, as well as administer various entrance
requirements. 13 Essentially, these entities serve as gatekeepers to
regulated professions. 14 When it comes to licensing lawyers,
occupational licensing entities serve as gatekeepers to an entire
branch of government—the judicial branch. 15
This Article focuses on lawyer licensing as an atypical
variety of administrative entity. In the interest of fostering
conversation about democratic procedures, I lay the groundwork
for evaluating the structure and function of various entities
charged with licensing lawyers. Specifically, I analyze the
SJC.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8UG-55SA] (stating the Maine Supreme Judicial Court decided
to adopt the Uniform Bar Examination beginning with the July 2017 administration of the
exam).
12. “Sunshine” as used in this Article refers to legislation, state constitutional clauses,
court rules, or agency regulations that require meetings of public bodies to be open, allowing
governmental operations to occur in the bright sunshine. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. I,
§ 24(a)-(b); Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 522(b) (2012); N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 143-318.18 (West 2017).
13. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 679.250(4)(a) (West 2017) (vesting the Oregon
Board of Dentistry with the power to examine applicants seeking a license to practice
dentistry); see also OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 679.065(1)(a)-(b) (West 2017) (setting forth age
and educational requirements for dental license applicants); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 679.070(1)-(2) (West 2017) (describing the parameters of the professional entrance
examination).
14. Adam B. Summers, Occupational Licensing: Ranking the States and Exploring
Alternatives 1, REASON FOUNDATION (Aug. 2017), http://reason.org /files
/762c8fe96431b6fa5e27ca64eaa1818b.pdf [https://perma.cc/HK5L-EERH].
15. See, e.g., Qualifications to Serve as a Trial Court Judge, NATIONAL CENTER FOR
STATE COURTS, http://data.ncsc.org /QvAJAXZfc /opendoc.htm? document=Public
%20App/SCO.qvw&host=QVS@qlikviewisa&anonymous=true [https://perma.cc/X7JF8LMC] (showing that a majority of jurisdictions require trial-level judges to be licensed
lawyers).
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rulemaking procedures and transparency practices of lawyerlicensing entities across fifty-one United States jurisdictions.
Based on study findings, I evaluate each jurisdiction, placing it
into one of three categories: (1) sufficient; (2) questionable; or
(3) insufficient. I then comparatively analyze the features of each
category.
Part I of the Article provides background information on the
creation and function of administrative agencies. Occupational
licensing entities are introduced as a special type of
administrative agency, with lawyer-licensing entities making up
a unique sub-type.
Part II begins by introducing the metrics used in this study
and describing how they relate to the quasi-legislative roles that
administrative agencies play. The first metric—rulemaking
procedures—analyzes the extent to which lawyer-licensing
entities promulgate rules within procedural frameworks, like
notice-and-comment rulemaking. The second metric—open
meeting laws—analyzes whether lawyer-licensing entities hold
meetings that are open to the public while exercising their
rulemaking authority. Part II concludes by setting forth the
methodology used in gathering data for the study.
Part III reports this study’s findings on the use of rulemaking
procedures and transparency practices by lawyer-licensing
entities. I chart whether a jurisdiction’s lawyer-licensing entity
uses notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures, whether the
entity possesses an express avenue for petition and declaratory
relief, and whether the entity holds meetings that are open to the
public when engaged in rulemaking.
Part IV discusses and comparatively analyzes this study’s
findings by categorizing jurisdictional use of standard rulemaking
procedures and adherence to open meeting practices as
(1) sufficient; (2) questionable; or (3) insufficient. Within each
of the three categories, I select one or more lawyer-licensing
entities and describe that entity’s structure, function, rulemaking
procedures, and transparency practices. I conclude by identifying
how jurisdictions might use this study’s data and offer
suggestions for further inquiry.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Administrative Agencies: Creation and Function
Administrative agencies are entities to which a
governmental authority delegates powers to administer a
particular set of governmental functions. 16 Whereas legislatures
possess power to make law, and courts possess power to interpret
law, both departments of our tripartite system of government can
be granted authority to delegate power. 17 The legislative and
judicial departments typically delegate such power by creating
subordinate administrative entities charged with administering
governmental functions on behalf of the more-superior
governmental body. 18 The subordinate entities are commonly
known as administrative agencies. 19
Administrative agencies, deriving their power from the
superior body that enables their existence, are often delegated one

16. See 1 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR. & RICHARD MURPHY, ADMIN. L. & PRAC. § 1:21
(3d ed. 2017). “An administrative agency is a governmental authority, other than a court and
other than a legislative body, which affects the rights of private parties through either
adjudication, rulemaking, investigating, prosecuting, negotiating, settling, or informally
acting.” Id. (quoting KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMIN. L. AND GOV’T 6 (2d ed. 1975). “The
power to issue regulations and to adjudicate disputes is delegated to administrative bodies
by Congress.” Id.
17. See, e.g., OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 2(B)(1)(g) (providing that the supreme court of
the state of Ohio has power over the “[a]dmission to the practice of law, the discipline of
persons so admitted, and all other matters relating to the practice of law”). The Supreme
Court of Ohio created a Board of Bar Examiners and delegated power to the Board. See
OHIO ST. GOVT. BAR R. 1, § 4. Similarly, the Florida Constitution explicitly grants its
supreme court the power to create administrative agencies. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 1. “The
Florida Board of Bar Examiners is an administrative agency of the Supreme Court of Florida
created by the court to implement the rules relating to bar admission.” FLA. BD. OF LAW
EXAM’RS R. 1-13; see also OKLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 36, 39 (providing the Oklahoma
legislature the power to create administrative agencies). In exercise of its power, the
Oklahoma legislature created a Board of Bar Examiners. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, § 14 (West
2017). Similarly, the Oregon Constitution grants its legislature “all powers necessary . . . of
a free, and independent State.” OR. CONST. art. IV, § 17. Exercising that authority, the
Oregon legislature created the Oregon State Board of Law Examiners. OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9.210(1) (West 2017).
18. See LA. STAT. ANN. § 37:832(A)(1) (West 2017) (evincing the Louisiana
legislature’s creation of the Louisiana State Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors as a
subordinate administrative entity).
19. See KOCH & MURPHY, supra note 16.

614

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 70:3

or more of the following powers: 20 rulemaking power, 21
adjudicatory power, 22 and/or investigatory power. 23 When
administrative entities are delegated a combination of powers,
particularly the combined power to make rules and adjudicate
contested cases, the entity has the implicit authority to
simultaneously take on both quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial
roles. 24 Concerns over separation of powers can arise when a
single entity applies and interprets the very rules that it makes,
highlighting the need for adequate oversight. 25

B. Occupational Licensing: A Special Type of Agency
Occupational licensing entities provide an example of such
separation of powers concerns. These agencies are a subset of
administrative agencies created specifically for the purpose of
regulating identified professions practiced within state borders. 26
Without a state-issued license, practicing one of these professions
constitutes unauthorized practice—a crime. 27 State licensing
agencies operate as gatekeepers to many professions. 28
Historically, principles of public safety partially justified the
regulation of occupational licensing, 29 requiring individuals
20. Some administrative entities are granted limited forms of these powers, or perhaps
none, serving merely an advisory role. Compare COLO. BAR ADMISSION R. 202.3
(providing for a board of law examiners to oversee exam administration and make
recommendations to an advisory committee regarding proposed rule changes), with COLO.
BAR ADMISSION R. 202.1 (stating the supreme court exercises jurisdiction over all matters
involving the licensing of lawyers in Colorado).
21. DANIEL L. FELDMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE SOURCES AND LIMITS OF
GOVERNMENT AGENCY POWER 71 (2016).
22. See id. at 109-10.
23. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 84-24 (West 2017) (providing the North
Carolina Board of Law Examiners with the power to conduct investigations).
24. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.3 (5th ed.
2010).
25. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of
Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 577 (1984).
26. See generally KOCH & MURPHY, supra note 16, § 1:12 (noting the longstanding
tradition of government regulation regarding “the competence and integrity of certain types
of professions”).
27. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-501(c)-(d) (2015) (stating the unauthorized
practice of law is punishable as a class A misdemeanor and that a second conviction under
the statute is punishable as a class D felony).
28. See Kleiner & Kreuger, supra note 2, at S175.
29. See, e.g., STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY
POLICY 22 (6th ed. 2006).
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seeking professional licensure to separately meet the regulatory
requirements of each state. 30
In administering this gatekeeping function, occupational
licensing entities are often granted the same types of powers as
all other types of agencies—rulemaking, adjudicatory, and
investigatory. 31 Thus, occupational licensing agencies are
vulnerable to the same risks and concerns as any other
administrative agency that possesses and exercises combined
governmental powers. 32
As such, the very structure of
administrative agencies, including occupational licensing
agencies, creates a need for adequate oversight. 33
Well-known legislative responses to concerns regarding
adequate oversight and a lack of uniformity among state and
federal agencies have included the passage of federal and state
administrative procedure acts and government-in-the-sunshine
laws. 34 Both administrative procedure acts and government-inthe-sunshine laws allow for observation of and participation in
agency operation, which contributes to adequate oversight. 35
State administrative procedure acts and state open meeting laws

30. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-1-3 (West 2017) (stating that the Alabama State Board
of Public Accountancy “may adopt and amend rules and regulations” pertaining to the
accountants); ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-12-203 (2013) (providing that the Arkansas State Board
of Public Accountancy may adopt rules and regulations for the profession).
31. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 84-24 (West 2017) (delegating to the North
Carolina Board of Law Examiners the power to make rules, perform investigations, and issue
licenses with respect to admission to the North Carolina State Bar).
32. See, e.g., N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1107, 1116-17 (2015)
(denying sovereign immunity for want of active state supervision to the North Carolina
Board of Dental Examiners in defending an action brought by the Federal Trade
Commission).
33. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-504 (2011) (amended 2017) (delegating to
a board of cosmetology the power to adopt and enforce rules concerning sanitary and safety
requirements for salons).
34. Administrative procedure acts exist at both the federal and state levels. Compare
5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2012), with GA. CODE ANN. § 50-13-1 (West 2017). This Article
focuses on administrative procedure acts at the state level, since the vast majority of
occupational licensing regulation is done by states. See Kleiner, supra note 4, at 5.
35. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 21.1 (West 2017) (declaring the policy of the Iowa
open meetings law is to assure the public has access to governmental decisions); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 14.001 (West 2017) (stating purposes of the Minnesota Administrative
Procedure Act as “to provide oversight of . . . administrative agencies” and “to increase
public participation in the formulation of administrative rules”). See generally PIERCE, supra
note 24, at 497 (noting political accountability created by the rulemaking process).
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often apply to occupational licensing entities that regulate
occupations practiced within state borders. 36

C. Lawyer-Licensing Entities: An Atypical Type
While occupational licensing entities across the country are
often subject to procedural process rules 37 that help maintain our
democratic society, entities that license lawyers have not been
uniformly subject to standard rulemaking procedures or
transparency practices. 38 This section summarizes key historical
developments of lawyer-licensing entities and identifies facts that
make lawyer licensing distinct from other occupational licensing
regimes.
In the early part of this country’s existence, states adopted
ad hoc approaches to the licensing of lawyers. 39 These

36. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-1-3(g) (West 2017) (stating that the board of public
accountancy “may adopt and amend rules and regulations pursuant to the Administrative
Procedure Act”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-100-202(b)(1) (2016) (providing the Board of
Examiners in Speech-Language Pathology and Audiology the power to adopt rules and
regulations relating to professional conduct and directing the Board to do so in accordance
with the Arkansas Administrative Procedure Act); ARIZ. REV. STAT ANN. §§ 38431(6), -431.01(A) (West 2017) (mandating all public-body meetings be public and defining
public bodies to include “multimember governing bodies of departments, agencies,
institutions and instrumentalities”); CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 11123(a), 11126(c)(1)-(2) (West
2017) (mandating state body meetings be public, but allowing licensing entities to hold
closed sessions in special situations related to testing and individual applicant privacy); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 83A-2(a) (2017) (“The North Carolina Board of Architecture shall have
the power and responsibility to administer the provisions of this Chapter in compliance with
the Administrative Procedure Act.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 143-318.10(a), -318.18(6)
(West 2017) (mandating public body meetings be public, but creating exceptions for
licensing agencies when the meeting regards testing or an individual applicant or licensee).
37. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-1-3(g) (West 2017) (stating that the board of public
accountancy “may adopt and amend rules and regulations pursuant to the Administrative
Procedure Act”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 150B-2(1a), -21.2(a) (West 2017) (defining
“agency” as an agency belonging to the executive branch and requiring agencies to provide
notice-and-comment opportunities); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 101.35, 119.01(A)(1) (West
2017) (creating a “joint committee on agency rule review” and defining “agency” as an entity
“having authority to promulgate rules”).
38. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 50-13-2(1) (West 2017) (exempting the judiciary and
Georgia’s Board of Bar Examiners from being subject to the Georgia Administrative
Procedure Act).
39. See, e.g., DEP’T OF CULTURAL RES. DIV. OF ARCHIVES AND HISTORY, ARCHIVES
AND RECORDS SECTION, GUIDE TO RESEARCH MATERIALS IN THE NORTH CAROLINA
STATE ARCHIVES: STATE AGENCY RECORDS 781-82 (1995) [hereinafter N.C. DEP’T OF
CULTURAL RES.].
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approaches were responsive to practical needs. 40 During this
early period, state courts were located in independent judicial
districts 41 and some states operated without a state supreme
court. 42 For lawyers, the issue was not whether they possessed a
statewide license; rather, the issue was whether they were
admitted to the bar for a particular judicial district or court. 43
Consequently, numerous lower-level state trial courts routinely
admitted lawyers to practice law within their respective
geographic jurisdictions. 44
As the judicial branch of a state government developed,
lawyer licensing became more centralized. 45 State courts and
their administrative responsibilities moved away from ad hoc
approaches to more formal structures. 46 For lawyer licensing, this
formal structure meant that bar admission was no longer handled
primarily on a local level, but rather was a matter of statewide
regulation. 47 Indeed, statewide regulation for several occupations
soon became established. 48 However, occupational licensing of
lawyers still differed from other occupations because lawyer

40. See Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE
L.J. 491, 496 (1985).
41. See N.C. DEP’T OF CULTURAL RES., supra note 39, at 725-26 (noting the state
legislature’s choice to create separate judicial districts within the state).
42. See id. at 726 (“[T]he terms supreme court and superior court were used
interchangeably . . . and the legislature made no effort to develop a separate and higher court
of last resort.”).
43. See id. at 781 (“In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, prospective
lawyers had to apply for separate admission to [North Carolina] county and superior courts,
and submit to an oral examination before two or more superior court judges.”).
44. See id.
45. See id. at 782 (“Written examinations were offered on the first Monday of each
term of the Supreme Court.”).
46. N.C. DEP’T OF CULTURAL RES., supra note 39, at 782.
47. See generally 1 ANTON-HERMANN CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION IN AMERICA 68 (1965) (observing that as court structures in Massachusetts
became more formalized the judiciary simultaneously began formulating rules for the
practice of law).
48. See, e.g., Act to Regulate General Contracting, 1935 Ala. Laws 721 (creating a
state licensing board to regulate general contractors in the state of Alabama) (codified as
amended at ALA. CODE § 34-8-20 (West 2017)).
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licensing almost always 49 remained housed under the judicial
branch of state government. 50
Despite a more centralized, statewide approach to lawyer
licensing, jurisdictions vary considerably in how lawyer-licensing
entities are structured. 51 For example, some states, such as
Ohio, 52 Kentucky, 53 and Pennsylvania, 54 have constitutions that
expressly proclaim that the state’s highest court shall regulate
lawyers, including their admission to the profession. In other
states, the high court claims its inherent power to regulate
admission to the bar through case law 55 or tradition. 56 In many
jurisdictions, the court possessing the power to regulate lawyer
licensing creates subordinate entities to handle those
administrative tasks. 57 Still in other states, professional bar
associations have integrated with state supreme courts, making
the creation of additional administrative entities unnecessary. 58
49. But see An Act to Provide for the Organization as an Agency of the State of North
Carolina of the North Carolina State Bar, and for Its Regulation, Powers, and Government,
Including the Admission of Lawyers to Practice and Their Discipline and Disbarment, 1933
N.C. Sess. Laws 313 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-15 to -38 (West 2017))
(describing in Section 9 the powers of the governing body of the state bar as “[s]ubject to the
superior authority of the General Assembly”); cf. An Act to Amend the Authority of the
North Carolina State Bar Concerning Paralegals and Fees Relating to Certification and to
Extend the Sunset of the Industrial Commission Fee Earmarked for Information Technology,
2004 N.C. Sess. Laws 670, 671 (striking the language “[s]ubject to the superior authority of
the General Assembly to legislate thereon by general law, and except as herein otherwise
limited” from N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-23).
50. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 2.2, at 22-27
(practitioner’s ed. 1986).
51. See infra notes 52-62 and accompanying text.
52. OHIO CONST. art. V, § 2(B)(1)(g).
53. KY. CONST. § 116.
54. PA. CONST. art. V, § 10.
55. Compare Hanson v. Grattan, 115 P. 646, 647 (Kan. 1911) (concluding
unequivocally that courts have exclusive power to set bar-admission standards), with In re
Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 636 (N.C. 1906) (confirming that setting bar-admission
standards in North Carolina is an exercise of the state’s police power and properly vested in
the legislature).
56. See WOLFRAM, supra note 50, at 22-23.
57. See, e.g., COLO. BAR ADMISSION R. 202.2(1)-(2) (creating an Advisory
Committee that “shall have oversight over the attorney admissions process”).
58. Take, for example, the birth and subsequent evolutions of the Alaska Bar
Association. Although the bar association was founded in the late 1800s, the district courts
still heard lawyer-disciplinary cases until the aftermath of United States v. Stringer, 124 F.
Supp. 705 (D. Alaska 1954). See Pamela Cravez, A Revolt in the Ranks: The Great Alaska
Court-Bar Fight, 13 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 5-7 (1996). That case, in which an Alaskan district
court drastically mishandled a disciplinary matter, catalyzed the Alaska Supreme Court’s
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With an integrated approach, bar associations exercise
governmental power and can take on a primary role in licensing
lawyers. 59 In a small number of jurisdictions, state supreme
courts play a minimal role in the licensing of lawyers, with the
state legislature, other administrative bodies, or lower-level
courts retaining significant power. 60 For example, in North
Carolina, the entities that examine and admit lawyers to the state’s
bar are the North Carolina State Bar and the Board of Law
examiners, but the North Carolina Supreme Court has never
acknowledged either of these entities as being part of the judicial
branch of government or an “arm of the court.” 61 Indeed, these
entities were created by the legislature, demonstrating that not all
lawyer-licensing entities are housed within the judicial branch of
government. 62
In addition to variation in the formal structures of lawyerlicensing entities, considerable differences exist in how these
entities function. For example, in those jurisdictions where state
supreme courts create judicial branch administrative entities to
handle lawyer licensing, some courts create one entity charged
with overseeing the entirety of the licensing process, 63 but others
create two separate entities—one charged with handling character
and fitness matters and the other charged with handling
examination matters. 64 In jurisdictions with more than one

adoption of the Alaska Bar Association via statute. Id.; 1955 Alaska Sess. Laws 410 (codified
at ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 08.08.010 (West 2017) (showing that the Alaska Bar Association
was adopted by the state supreme court via statute following the Stringer case).
59. See Cravez, supra note 58, at 7.
60. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 84-15 (West 2017) (creating the North Carolina
State Bar as an agency of the state).
61. See, e.g., N.C. State Bar v. Tillett, 794 S.E.2d 743, 746, 748 (N.C. 2016) (stating
the North Carolina State Bar is an agency created by the legislature).
62. An Act to Provide for the Organization as an Agency of the State of North Carolina
of the North Carolina State Bar, and for Its Regulation, Powers, and Government, Including
the Admission of Lawyers to Practice and Their Discipline and Disbarment, 1933 N.C. Sess.
Laws 319 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 84-15 to -38 (2015)) (describing
in Section 9 the powers of the governing body of the state bar as “[s]ubject to the superior
authority of the General Assembly”).
63. See, e.g., STATE OF CONN. JUD. BRANCH, CONNECTICUT BAR EXAMINING
COMMITTEE, http:// www.jud.ct.gov /cbec /index.htm [https://perma.cc/33N8-RNVE]
(stating that “[t]he Committee prepares and administers the bar examination and investigates
the character and fitness of” applicants).
64. See, e.g., COLO. BAR ADMISSION R. 202.3 (creating both a Law Committee to
oversee examinations and a Character and Fitness Committee to investigate applicants).
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judicially created administrative entity, 65 whether the relationship
among those entities is lateral or hierarchical varies as well. 66
Noticeably, even within similarly structured entities, the
distribution and exercise of regulatory powers varies greatly. 67
Some state supreme courts retain or delegate more power and
oversight than others. 68
This article focuses on two implications stemming from the
historical development of lawyer-licensing entities. The first
implication is widespread variation in jurisdictional use of
rulemaking procedures and transparency practices. This study
lays the foundation for studying those variations, including how
entities that license lawyers can be outliers in conforming to
standard democratic procedures in several respects. 69 The second
implication is the adequacy of oversight for some entities that
exercise the power to license lawyers. Oversight measures, which
have become commonplace for other administrative agencies 70
65. GA. SUP. CT. R. pt. A, § 1(a) (creating a Board to Determine Fitness of Bar
Applicants).
66. Compare SUP. CT. OF GA.: OFFICE OF BAR ADMISSIONS, RULES GOVERNING
ADMISSION
TO
THE
PRACTICE
OF
LAW
(Jan.
2016),
https://www.gabaradmissions.org/information [https://perma.cc/Z59T-G2TU] (“Admission
to the practice of law in Georgia is under the jurisdiction of two separate and distinct boards,
the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants and the Board of Bar Examiners.”), with
GA. CODE ANN. § 50-13-2(1) (West 2016) (exempting the judiciary and Georgia Board of
Bar Examiners from being subject to the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, but not
mentioning whether the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants is also exempt).
67. Consider, for instance, Oregon and Alabama. The Oregon Supreme Court, which
possesses the power to promulgate bar-admission rules, created both a Board of Bar
Examiners and a Board of Governors of the Oregon State Bar. OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 9.210(1), 9.542(1) (West 2017); OR. BAR R. 1.2; The Board of Bar Examiners may
recommend to the supreme court rules relating to admission to the bar, and the Board of
Governors, subject to the court’s approval, may adopt procedural rules regarding its
investigatory powers over bar admission. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9.210(1), 9.542(1) (West
2017); OR. BAR R. 1.2. In Alabama, on the other hand, the Board of Commissioners of the
State Bar holds the power to make rules pertaining to “the qualifications and requirements
for admission to the practice of law.” ALA. CODE § 34-3-2, -40(a), -43(a)(1) (West 2017).
68. See supra note 67.
69. The amount of variation I found among lawyer-licensing entities with respect to
the use of rulemaking procedures and transparency practices appeared to be similar to the
amount of variation in agency process that prompted “uniformity” to be a guiding principle
in administrative procedure acts at both the federal and state levels. See infra, Parts III, IV.
70. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-1-3(g) (2017) (stating that the board of public
accountancy “may adopt and amend rules and regulations pursuant to the Administrative
Procedure Act”); ALA. CODE § 41-22-2(b)(1) (stating that the purpose of the Administrative
Procedure Act is to provide legislative oversight for agencies); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 150B-21.2 (West 2017) (requiring agencies, as part of the Administrative Procedure Act,
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can sometimes be absent in the context of licensing lawyers. 71 As
noted in this Article’s introduction, entities charged with
licensing lawyers not only constitute gatekeepers for a profession,
but also hold keys to the judicial branch of government. 72 For
this reason alone, fair procedures and transparent operations for
lawyer-licensing entities affect more than an individual’s ability
to pursue a chosen occupation. Fair procedural process and
transparent operations affect who holds essential positions within
the judicial branch of government and, consequently, who
exercises state and federal judicial power. 73

II. STUDY METRICS
This study presents data on two metrics: (1) the extent to
which lawyer-licensing entities exercise rulemaking authority in
accordance with rulemaking procedures; and (2) whether lawyerlicensing entities regularly hold open meetings to ensure
transparency. 74 These two metrics are useful in beginning a
conversation regarding the lack of uniformity in the operation of
lawyer-licensing entities and an inadequacy in adhering to
procedural process safeguards. This conversation is particularly
relevant today as the channels and providers of legal services
evolve. 75
to provide notice-and-comment opportunities); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 150B-2(1a) (West
2017) (defining “agency” as an agency belonging to the executive branch); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 101.35 (West 2017) (creating a “joint committee on agency rule review” to provide
oversight); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 119.01(A)(1) (West 2017) (defining “agency” as an
entity “having authority to promulgate rules”).
71. See infra Appendix.
72. See, e.g., KAN. CONST. art. 3, § 7 (“Justices of the supreme court and judges of the
district court shall be . . . duly authorized by the supreme court of Kansas to practice law.”);
MONT. CONST. art. 7, § 9 (requiring that judges in Montana be admitted to and members of
the Montana bar for at least five years before serving as a judge).
73. Notably, the exercise of ordinary judicial power can be far-reaching, having
worldwide implications. See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL
462040, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017), aff’d 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (demonstrating
the ability of a federal district court judge seated in the state of Washington to enter a
nationwide temporary restraining order, thereby enjoining the enforcement of specific
sections of a presidential order that affected United States residents in areas of “employment,
education, business, family relations, and freedom to travel”).
74. Open meeting laws are popularly known as “Government in the Sunshine” acts.
See, e.g., Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2010).
75. See N.C. COMM’N ON THE ADMIN. OF LAW & JUSTICE, INTERIM REPORT: LEGAL
PROFESSIONALISM COMMITTEE 5 (July 2016), http://nccalj.org /wp-content /uploads /2016
/07/Legal-Professionalism_interim-report_NCCALJ.pdf [https://perma.cc/CV9J-UZR9].
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A. Defining the Metrics
1. Rulemaking Procedures
Generally speaking, a rule is “[a] principle or regulation set
up by authority” 76 that describes what action is permitted,
prohibited or required. 77 In the context of professional licensure,
state occupational licensing entities typically promulgate rules
that set forth licensing requirements for education, practical
experience, character and fitness, and examination. 78
Formulating and adopting rules that express such requirements is
“rulemaking.” 79 Thus, rulemaking is what agencies do when they
formulate, adopt, amend, or withdraw agency rules. Rules and
regulations brought about by the rulemaking process help
agencies administer their delegated duties. 80
Rulemaking procedures create a uniform and fair process by
which agencies promulgate rules—a process that also provides
for express avenues of public engagement while agencies
function in a quasi-legislative manner. 81
Three standard
76. Rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990). The Federal Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) defines a rule as “the whole or a part of an agency statement of general
or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law
or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an
agency . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2011). Individual states, following Congress’ lead,
eventually enacted state versions of the APA that define state rulemaking similarly. See,
e.g., ALA. CODE § 41-22-3(9) (West 2017).
77. See STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 13
(1985).
78. See, e.g., N.Y. CT. R. § 520.16(a) (requiring fifty hours of pro bono service prior
to admission to the bar); 21 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 16B.0101(a) (2017) (requiring examination);
21 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 16B.0201(a) (requiring education); 21 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 16B.0302
(investigating requisite character and reputation of applicants seeking dental licensure).
79. See PIERCE, supra note 24, at § 6.1 (“Rulemaking is ‘the issuance of regulations
or the making of determinations which are addressed to indicated but unnamed or unspecified
persons or situations.’”) (quoting Ralph F. Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule-Making,
52 HARV. L. REV. 259, 265 (1938)).
80. CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE
LAW AND MAKE POLICY, at xi (1994) (“Rulemaking . . . provides direction and content
for . . . program implementation . . . and other government activities”).
81. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 14.001 (West 2017) (identifying fairness,
uniformity, public access, and public participation as goals of the Minnesota Administrative
Procedure Act). In addition to promoting uniformity, fairness, and public engagement, these
procedures also serve an essential role in ensuring adequate oversight of administrative

2017

DO IT IN THE SUNSHINE

623

procedures by which the goals of uniformity and fairness are
achieved include:
(1) notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures; 82
(2) an express avenue to petition the agency; and 83
(3) an express avenue to seek declaratory relief. 84

a. Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking Procedures
Notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures refer to a basic
tenet of due process, whereby citizens receive advance notice of
proposals to change rules and have an opportunity to be heard
prior to changes being made. 85 When promulgating rules with
substantive impact, administrative agencies must follow a threestep procedure to adhere to notice-and-comment rulemaking
standards. 86 Those three steps include issuing a notice of a
proposed rule change, receiving and considering public comment
on the proposed change, and issuing a final rule along with a
statement about the rule’s basis and purpose. 87
Advance notice and an opportunity to comment are
especially important to ensuring adequate oversight because they
provide the foundation for a democratic rulemaking procedure.
Issuing a notice of rulemaking is how our government
communicates with its citizens about government and citizen
obligations, responsibilities, and benefits. 88 Without notice,
stakeholders are cut-off from governmental action. Comment
serves as the next logical step in contributing to adequate
oversight. Comment preserves a space of time during which
citizens may share opinions, ideas, and offer critiques to

agencies. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-43-1.101(2) (West 2017) (stating one purpose of
the Mississippi Administrative Procedures Law is “to provide legislative oversight of powers
and duties delegated to administrative agencies”).
82. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 150B-19.1(c) (West 2017) (notice-andcomment rulemaking).
83. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 150B-20(a) (West 2017) (petition).
84. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 150B-4(a) (West 2017) (declaratory rulings).
While there are alternative channels for the public to engage administrative agencies, noticeand-comment, petition, and declaratory relief are the focus of this Article.
85. WILLIAM F. FOX, UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 1.04[B] at 17 (6th
ed. 2012).
86. PIERCE, supra note 24, § 7.1 at 557.
87. See id.
88. See KERWIN, supra note 80; PIERCE, supra note 24, § 7.3, at 570-71.
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government officials concerning proposed changes to rules. 89
Thus, without comment, citizens may not meaningfully
participate as members of a democracy.
To constitute notice for purposes of rulemaking procedures,
notice must be given in advance, where the amount of time
between when the public is informed of a proposed rule change
and when an administrative agency acts to adopt such change is
an amount of time that is reasonable for citizens to learn about the
proposal for change. 90 In addition, notice contemplated for these
purposes must be accessible. 91 Thus, a notice of a proposed rule
change that was posted somewhere obscure, like in a dark alley
or within a location on an agency website that is difficult to
quickly find, would not constitute sufficient access in order for
the notice to comply with the intent of this rulemaking
procedure. 92 Finally, notice must be informative in order for it to
facilitate the democratic ideal of meaningful participation. 93 To
be informative, notice must advise readers of what result the
proposed rule will create. 94 If a notice of a proposed rule change
is posted, but the substance of the rule that is being considered for
change is not a part of that posting, the goal of notice will not be
met. 95
Similarly, for an opportunity to comment to be meaningful,
the public must be instructed on how to offer such comments.96
Necessary information includes: (1) where to send comments;
(2) the required format—oral or written; and (3) a deadline for
submitting them. 97
Together, notice and comment create a space of time that
works to preserve two components of our democracy ideal. 98
First, that space of time allows for meaningful public participation
in the agency rulemaking process. 99 This allows time for experts
to weigh in and share empirical evidence and data that is relevant
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

See PIERCE, supra note 24, § 7.3, at 570-71.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 570-72.
See PIERCE, supra note 24, § 7.3, at 570-72.
See id.
See id. at 572.
Id. at 571-72.
Id. at 570-72.
See PIERCE, supra note 24, § 7.3, at 571.
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to the proposed agency action, which may not be accessible or
known by those internal to the agency. 100 Second, notice and
comment work together to slow the pace of change for new
regulatory requirements to take effect. 101 This space of time
between the beginning of the notice and the end of the comment
period allows those persons affected by a changed regulation the
time to take measures to conform their behavior to a new
regulatory standard. 102

b. Public Avenues to Petition for Change
In the context of agency rulemaking, the procedure known
as petition creates an express avenue for those outside the agency
to initiate a rulemaking proceeding. 103 Like rulemaking that is
initiated from within an agency, a petition can concern adding a
new rule, amending an existing rule, or withdrawing an obsolete
rule. 104 For a petition to satisfy its procedural intent, agency rules
regarding the petition procedure should provide clear instructions
to those outside the agency on how to comply with the
requirements for submitting petitions. 105 An express avenue to
petition and initiate a rulemaking proceeding opens up
rulemaking to a much broader group of people than those internal
to the agency. 106 With a petition, then, it is possible to produce
superior rules through a kind of crowd sourcing. 107
Avenues to petition that are expressly provided for within
agency rules allow those who are being regulated to initiate
proposals for change, acknowledging their perspective, as
100. See William V. Luneberg, Petitioning Federal Agencies for Rulemaking: An
Overview of Administrative and Judicial Practice and Some Recommendations for
Improvement, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1988).
101. See PIERCE, supra note 24, § 7.3, at 570.
102. Id.
103. See id., § 6.10, at 516-17.
104. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1056(M) (West 2017); N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 150B-20(a) (West 2017). For an example of an outdated rule, see RULES GOVERNING
ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW, N.C. BD. OF LAW EXAM’RS .0903,
http://ncble.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/rules.pdf
[https://perma.cc/96U5-KCTU].
Though the rule lists taxation as a testable subject, the board has not tested on tax law in
more than fifteen years.
105. See Luneberg, supra note 100, at 7-8; PIERCE, supra note 24, § 7.3, at 571.
106. See PIERCE, supra note 24, § 7.3, at 571.
107. See DAREN C. BRABHAM, CROWDSOURCING IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 21 (2015);
Luneberg, supra note 100, at 5-6.
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opposed to proposals for change coming only from the
perspective of those doing the regulating. 108 As a procedural
mechanism, an avenue to petition requires agencies to engage
with outside persons. 109

c. Declaratory Relief: Seeking Rule Clarity
Declaratory relief is a procedural process requiring
administrative entities to engage with those outside the agency. 110
Those who are substantially affected by an agency rule may
request clarification about the rule’s meaning, how the rule
applies under a given set of facts, or whether the rule is valid.111
To illustrate, suppose an applicant seeking a law license had
expunged criminal-record entries, and the licensing application
was unclear about whether the applicant needed to disclose those
expunged criminal-record entries. An express avenue for
declaratory relief would allow that applicant to force the agency
to declare what the disclosure requirements were and how that
rule applied in the context of an applicant who had expunged
criminal records. 112
By allowing outsiders to force the agency to state what a rule
means, declaratory relief contributes to the adequacy of agency
oversight. 113 The declaratory relief procedure facilitates the
realization that law should be written in a clear manner, a basic
tenet in our democratic society. 114

2. Open Meeting Laws
In addition to the three features of rulemaking procedures
described above, this study evaluates the extent to which lawyerlicensing entities 115 hold meetings that are open to the public.
108. See PIERCE, supra note 24, § 7.3, at 571.
109. See id.
110. See JAMES M. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES 6 (2d ed. 2006).
111. See id.; Administrative Declaratory Orders, 13 STAN. L. REV. 307, 307 (1961);
Burnele V. Powell, Administratively Declaring Order: Some Practical Applications of the
Administrative Procedure Act’s Declaratory Order Process, 64 N.C. L. REV. 277, 278-79
(1986).
112. See Powell, supra note 111, at 278-79, 289-90.
113. See id. at 294.
114. See id.
115. Entities that possess the power to adopt lawyer-licensing rules are the ones that
are most relevant to this Article.
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Open meeting laws are typically state statutory schemes, 116 and
are commonly known as sunshine laws or acts or opengovernment laws. 117 These laws secure the democratic ideal that
a government that is both for the people and by the people is one
that includes the consent of the people. 118 For consent to be
meaningful, it must be informed. 119 To this end, various types of
government-in-the-sunshine laws secure the public’s ability to
access information. 120 For example, the Freedom of Information
Act and Public Records Acts allow citizens to make requests for
information from governmental entities. 121 Similarly, open
meeting laws allow the public to access information by observing
agency operation during regularly scheduled meetings. 122 Worth
noting here is that open meeting laws provide not only access to
information, but also a measure of oversight because humans act
differently when they are being watched. 123 For this reason, I
have chosen to use the practice of holding open meetings as a
metric to evaluate transparency practices of lawyer-licensing
entities.
State open meeting statutory schemes set forth requirements
for public bodies and provide instructions on how those bodies
are to conduct meetings that are open to the public while
simultaneously allowing for proceedings, such as closed sessions
in order to preserve other important democratic values. 124 At their
116. But see FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 24 (adopting government-in-the-sunshine principles
in its state constitution).
117. See, e.g., Judy Nadler & Miriam Schulman, Open Meetings, Open Records, and
Transparency in Government, SANTA CLARA U. (Oct. 23, 2015), https://www.scu.edu
/ethics /focus-areas /government-ethics /resources /what-is-government-ethics /openmeetings-open-records-transparency-government/ [https://perma.cc/LE7N-ATR2].
118. See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (stating that
governmental power comes “from the consent of the governed”).
119. Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 900 (1994).
120. See PETER L. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 285
(2d ed. 2002) (describing how government-in-the-sunshine laws provide notice of agency
meetings and allow for public observation of agency action).
121. See CAL. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 6251, 6253 (West 2017); STRAUSS, supra note
120, at 276-77.
122. Brett Kandt, New Changes in Nevada’s Open Meeting Law: Promoting
Transparent Government, 20 NEV. LAW. 6, 6 (2012).
123. See STRAUSS, supra note 120, at 276.
124. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 143-318.11(a)(1) (West 2017) (permitting
limited portions of open meetings to occur during closed sessions for the purpose of
preventing the disclosure of privileged or confidential information under state or federal
law).
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core, open meeting laws require agencies to provide notice of
when and where they meet in order to prevent agencies from
wrongly using the power granted to them by the people. 125

B. Methodology
The previous section defined the metrics used in this study.
Before describing the methodology used to collect data, it is
worth noting that gathering data for these metrics can be complex.
One source of complexity is that answers to the questions posed
may be governed by authorities from any of the three branches of
government, requiring the evaluation of many sources. 126 A lack
of uniformity results from this multi-source oversight of lawyerlicensing entities. Whereas in a typical research project, the
question posed implicates only one branch of government at a
time, or there is more uniformity across jurisdictions with respect
to whether the issue is answered by researching authorities within
either the executive, legislative, or judicial branches of
government, the questions posed by this article often involve
more than one governmental branch. 127 In addition to the sheer
number of sources, answers supplied by authorities emanating
from one branch of government are neither exclusive nor
exhaustive, as authorities from a separate government branch may
control and answer the same questions in a different way. 128
Finally, if and when government branch authorities or practices

125. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 143-318.12 (West 2017); see also IND. CODE ANN.
§ 5-14-1.5-1 (West 2017) (requiring that all public agencies conduct their business in
meetings open to the public).
126. Compare N.C. State Bar, 794 S.E.2d at 746 (stating that the North Carolina State
Bar is an agency created by the legislature), with KY. CONST. § 116 (vesting power to
regulate lawyers in the Kentucky Supreme Court).
127. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 44-04-19 (West 2017); N.D. Att’y Gen. Op.
90-04 (Jan. 23, 1990) (stating that the North Dakota open meeting law applies to the state
bar association).
128. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 44-04-19 (West 2017) (requiring that “all
meetings of a public entity . . . be open to the public”); N.D. Att’y Gen. Op. 2005-O-19 (Nov.
22, 2005) (concluding that the open meetings law does not apply to committees of the North
Dakota Supreme Court tasked with promulgating rules of procedure; N.D. Att’y Gen. Op.
90-04 (Jan. 23, 1990) (stating that the open meetings statute applies to the North Dakota
State Bar Board).
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seem to conflict, resolving inconsistencies is not necessarily
intuitive or easy. 129
A second complexity in conducting this research arises
because the judicial entities and rules that govern them can be
compound in structure and encompass multiple entities, each
having its own set of rules. 130 Further, it can be difficult to
discriminate whether the relationships between some entities are
lateral or hierarchical in form, further complicating questions
about whether and the extent to which one entity’s procedural
rules apply to another entity’s operations. 131
Third, the organization of court rules is neither consistent nor
intuitive. 132 Again, judicial systems across the states are not
structured in a uniform way. 133 Widespread variations in
approach require persistent and thorough research and a close
reading of current and historical authorities. Of course, these
complexities are amplified by the fact that court rules are dynamic
and change annually. 134

129. For example, it is not always clear whether a state’s administrative procedures
act or open meeting laws apply to lawyer-licensing entities. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 61.805(2) (West 2017). Although at least a few jurisdictions’ lawyer-licensing entities
appear to be subject to their state’s administrative procedure act, others may be expressly
exempt. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 50-13-2 (West 2017). Likewise, several jurisdictions
have open meeting laws that expressly apply to lawyer-licensing entities, while some
jurisdictions have open meetings statutes containing language that does not answer the
question with any degree of certainty. Compare ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 08.08.075 (West
2017), with KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.805(2) (West 2017).
130. See, e.g., COLO. BAR ADMISSION. R. 202.3(1) (providing for a state board of law
examiners that consists of two other subcommittees—the Law Committee and the Character
and Fitness Committee).
131. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-80 (West 2017) (stating that the superior
court has the power to promulgate bar admission rules); State of Conn., Judicial Branch,
Practice Book Revisions Superior Court Rules Forms, CONN. L.J. (July 4, 2017), http://
www.jud.ct.gov /lawjournal /Docs /Misc /2017 /27 /pblj_7901.pdf [https://perma.cc/868THGLT] (stating that the judges of the superior court adopted a new bar-admission rule
relating to military spouses); 2000 Information Booklet, STATE OF CONN.: JUD. BRANCH,
https:// www.jud.ct.gov /cbec /Notice_ Amend_ UBEScoreEthics_ Eff0916.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U33W-BDBH] [hereinafter 2000 Information Booklet] (stating that the
Connecticut Bar Examining Committee adopted the presented rules).
132. See infra note 152.
133. See discussion supra Section II.C.
134. See CBEC Regulation Amendments Effective Oct. 2017, STATE OF CONN.: JUD.
BRANCH, https:// www.jud.ct.gov /cbec /Notice_ Amends_ AppFees_ 2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P4HB-EQN8].

630

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 70:3

1. Step One: Identifying Rulemaking Power
Collecting data on jurisdictional use of rulemaking
procedures and holding open meetings as a transparency practice
involved three steps. The first step was to answer the threshold
question, “Who has the power to regulate?” This required
identifying the entity or entities within a jurisdiction that possess
and exercise rulemaking authority to formulate and adopt lawyerlicensing rules. 135
Research for step one began with reviewing state
constitutions, as these documents sometimes delegate rulemaking
power for lawyer regulation to the judicial branch. 136 When state
constitutions did not provide a definitive answer, I continued
researching other controlling law, including case law, statutes, 137
rules of court, 138 administrative regulations, and attorney general
opinions. Once I identified the entity or entities possessing
rulemaking authority for promulgating lawyer-licensing rules
within each jurisdiction, I proceeded to step two, which involved
assessing whether rules were formulated and adopted pursuant to
standard rulemaking procedures.

135. A variety of institutional structures built around the rulemaking power emerged.
See infra note 152.
136. Several state constitutions contain express provisions concerning rulemaking
power and lawyer regulation, including lawyer licensing. See, e.g., VT. CONST. ch. 2, § 37
(stating the Vermont Supreme Court shall make and promulgate all rules relating to the
practice and procedure in all courts).
137. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 27-11-02 (West 2017) (declaring the “power
to admit persons to practice as attorneys” is vested in the North Dakota Supreme Court);
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 27-11-19 (West 2017) (stating that “[t]he supreme court, after
receiving and considering the state board of law examiners’ report of the results of an
examination of applicants for admission to the bar” and the board’s recommendations for
that applicant, “shall enter an order authorizing the issuance of certificates of admission to
the bar to those applicants the court considers entitled to admission”).
138. See, e.g., HAW. SUP. CT. R. 1.1 (declaring that the Hawaii Supreme Court “shall
appoint a Board of Examiners . . . to administer the process of admission to the bar,” while
reserving the court’s authority to “oversee and control the privilege of the practice of law”);
HAW. SUP. CT. R. 1.2(d) (“The Board shall promulgate procedural rules within the scope of
its powers and authority, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.”); HAW. SUP. CT. R.
17(a)-(b) (creating the Hawaii State Bar as an “independent, member-governed organization”
with the purpose of assisting the supreme court in its governance of the legal profession
through carrying out the promulgated rules of admissions, but clarifying that the supreme
court retains ultimate authority over the admission of attorneys).
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2. Step Two: Locating Rulemaking Procedures
In step two, I focused on locating procedural rules governing
how entities must exercise the power to formulate and adopt rules.
Whereas the first step answered “who,” the second step answered
“what.” More specifically, step two answered the question “what
are the procedures that the rulemaking authorities use for creating
rules that regulate lawyer-licensing?”
My goal in assessing the rulemaking procedures metric: To
what extent does this jurisdiction promulgate lawyer-licensing
rules within a procedural framework that includes standard
rulemaking procedures? Specifically, I searched for evidence of
notice-and-comment rulemaking, an express avenue to petition
for rule changes, and an express declaratory relief mechanism.
Within state statutory schemes, I reviewed state administrative
procedure acts. The goal in examining these acts was to
determine whether the act’s procedures apply to lawyer-licensing
entities. Often, the answer to the question required examining
how the term “agency” was defined within the state’s
administrative procedure act. 139
139. In the jurisdictions researched, the term “agency” was defined with language
fairly categorized as formal, functional, or hybrid. States with a hybrid definition of
“agency” include both functional and formal terms that define an agency based upon how
that entity functions. Approximately thirty jurisdictions define the term agency using both
functional and formal language. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-166(1) (West 2017)
(defining “agency” as an entity “authorized by law to make regulations”); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 29, § 10102(1) (West 2017) (defining “agency” as an entity “authorized by law to make
regulations”); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-13-2(1) (West 2017) (defining “agency” as an entity
“authorized by law expressly to make rules”); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91-1(1) (West 2017)
(defining “agency” as an entity “authorized by law to . . . adjudicate contested cases”); IND.
CODE ANN. § 4-22-2-3(a) (West 2017) (defining “agency” as an entity “exercising any of
the executive (including the administrative) powers of state government”); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 77-502(a) (West 2017) (defining “agency” as an entity “authorized by law to administer,
enforce or interpret any law of this state”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13A.010 (West 2017)
(substituting “administrative body” for agency, and defining the term as “each state board,
bureau, cabinet, commission, department, authority, officer, or other entity . . . authorized by
law to promulgate administrative regulations”); LA. STAT. ANN. § 49:951(2) (West 2017)
(defining “agency” as an entity that “makes rules”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 8002(2)
(West 2017) (defining “agency” as an entity “authorized by law to adopt rules”); MD. CODE
ANN., STATE GOV’T § 10-202(b)(1) (defining “agency” as an entity “authorized by law to
adjudicate contested cases”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § 1(2) (West 2017) (defining
“agency” as an entity “authorized by law to make regulations”); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 14.02(2) (West 2017) (defining “agency” as an entity “authorized by law to make rules”);
MO. ANN. STAT. § 536.010(2) (West 2017) (defining “agency” as an entity “authorized by
law or the constitution to make rules”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-3-102(1) (West 2017)
(defining “agency” as an entity “authorized by law to make rules”); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.
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§ 84-901(1) (West 2017) (defining “agency” as entities “authorized by law to make rules and
regulations”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 233B.031 (West 2017) (defining “agency” as an
entity “authorized by law to make regulations”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-A:1(II) (West
2017) (defining “agency” as an entity “authorized by law to make rules”); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 52:14B-2 (West 2017) (defining “agency” as an entity “authorized by statute to make,
adopt or promulgate rules”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-8-2(A) (West 2017) (defining “agency”
as an entity “authorized by law to make rules”); N.Y. A.P.A. LAW § 102(1) (McKinney
2017) (defining “agency” as an entity “authorized by law to make rules”); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 119.01(A)(1) (West 2017) (defining “agency” as an entity “having authority to
promulgate rules”); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 183.310(1) (West 2017) (defining “agency” as
an entity “authorized by law to make rules”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-310(2) (West 2017)
(defining “agency” as an entity “authorized by law to determine contested cases”); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 1-26-1(1) (West 2017) (defining “agency” as an entity “vested with the
authority to exercise any portion of the state’s sovereignty”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-102(2)
(West 2017) (defining “agency” as an entity “authorized or required by any statute or
constitutional provision to make rules”); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.003(7) (West
2017) (defining “agency” as an entity “that makes rules”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 801(b)(1)
(West 2017) (defining “agency” as an entity “authorized by law to make rules”); VA. CODE
ANN. § 2.2-4001 (West 2017) (defining “agency” as an entity “empowered by the basic laws
to make regulations”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 34.05.010(2) (West 2017) (defining
“agency” as an entity “authorized by law to make rules”); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-1-2(a)
(West 2017) (defining “agency” as an entity “authorized by law to make rules”). States with
a formal definition of “agency” are characterized by using specific titles to refer to
administrative entities and not focusing on the entity’s function within a governmental
scheme. See ALA. CODE § 41-22-3(1) (West 2017) (defining “agency” as a “board, bureau,
commission, department, officer, or other administrative office or unit”); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 41-1001(1) (West 2017) (defining “agency” as a “board, commission, department,
officer or other administrative unit”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-15-202(2)(A) (2017) (defining
“agency” as “a board, commission, department, officer, or other authority of the
government”); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6252(f)(1) (West 2017) (defining “agency” as a “state
body”); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-4-102(3) (West 2017) (defining “agency” as “board,
bureau, commission, department, institution, division, section, or officer of the state”); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 120.52(1) (West 2017) (defining agencies as “officers or governmental
entities”); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 100 / 1-20 (West 2017) (defining “agency” to include
an “officer, board, commission, and agency created by the Constitution” or “officer,
department, board, commission, agency, institution, authority, [or] university . . . of the
State”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 17A.2(1) (West 2017) (defining “agency” as an “administrative
office”); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 24.203(2) (West 2017) (defining “agency” as a
“department, bureau, division, section, board, commission, trustee, authority or officer”);
MISS. CODE. ANN. § 25-43-1.102(a) (West 2017) (defining “agency” as an “administrative
unit”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 150B-2(1a) (West 2017) (defining “agency” to include “a
board, a commission, a department, a division, a council, and any other unit of government
in the executive branch”); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 28-32-01(2) (West 2017)
(“administrative unit of the executive branch of state government”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
75, § 250.3(3) (West 2017) (“any constitutionally or statutorily created state board, bureau,
commission, office, authority”); 71 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 745.3 (West 2017)
(“department, departmental administrative board or commission, independent board or
commission, agency or other authority”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-4-103(1)(b) (West 2017)
(“board, commission, department, division, officer, council, office, committee, bureau, or
other administrative unit”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 227.01(1) (West 2017) (“board, commission,
committee, department or officer”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-3-101(b)(i) (West 2017)
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As most state administrative procedure acts do not apply to
entities responsible for licensing lawyers, I continued researching
controlling authorities within the judicial branch of government
upon exhausting legislative branch authorities. The judicial
branch authorities included supreme court rules, as well as rules
and regulations of subordinate judicial entities with rulemaking
authority. Examples of the types of subordinate entities include
supreme court advisory commissions that supervise all
subordinate judicial entities, boards of law (or bar) examiners
created by the state’s high court, and state bars which originated
as private associations but were later incorporated into the judicial
branch of government. 140
If the answer to whether lawyer-licensing rules were
promulgated according to standard rulemaking procedures was
still unclear (which was often), I continued my research by
exploring judicial-entity websites, including state supreme court
websites. On these websites, I searched for both express
provisions setting forth rulemaking procedures and indirect
evidence that entities voluntarily used rulemaking procedures
when promulgating rules. Worth noting here, I considered
voluntary practices for notice-and-comment rulemaking
procedures but not for avenues to petition or seek declaratory
relief. In addition to exploring websites, I made direct contact
with many jurisdictions through phone calls or email. Targets for
phone calls and email included supreme court clerks, board of law
examiner chairs, secretaries, and executive directors, practicing
attorneys with a current law practice related to occupational
licensing, and academics who study and write about lawyerlicensing issues.

(“authority, bureau, board, commission, department, division, officer or employee of the
state, [or] a county, city or town or other political subdivision of the state”). The only state
to define agency in purely functional terms is Alaska. See ALASKA STAT. ANN.
§ 44.62.040(a) (West 2017) (defining an “agency” as possessing “regulation-making
authority”).
140. See discussion of the origins of the Alaska Bar Association, supra note 58; see
also NEV. SUP. CT. R. 49(1) (fixing the power of the board of bar examiners); COLO. BAR
ADMISSION R. 202.2.
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3. Step Three: Verifying Public Meetings
In step three, I shifted to answering the question posed by
the second metric: To what extent do lawyer-licensing entities
regularly hold meetings that are open to the public? 141 Similar to
the process I used in step two, I began by researching primary
authorities, first by examining state statutory schemes. 142 After
locating a jurisdiction’s government-in-the-sunshine act, I
analyzed the language of the statute to see if the language directly
addressed whether that jurisdiction’s lawyer-licensing entity is
required to hold open meetings. More often than not, further
research was required. Even if a jurisdiction’s statutory language
expressly excludes “courts” from the scope of the act, it does not
necessarily follow that the legislature intended the term “courts”
to include judicially created administrative bodies that function
more like administrative agencies than judicial branch courts. 143
Because executive branch authorities, such as state attorney
general opinions, 144 frequently provided a direct answer to that
question, I examined them as well. 145 If the jurisdiction had no
attorney general opinion on point, I shifted to researching judicial
branch authorities, including court rules 146 and court orders. 147
When more formal research methods did not provide a definitive
answer, I explored judicial-entity websites and made direct

141. My primary focus remained on answering this question as it related to
jurisdictional entities that possess and exercise rulemaking power to adopt and amend
lawyer-licensing rules.
142. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-1.5-1 (West 2017) (requiring that all public
agencies conduct their business in meetings open to the public). At least one jurisdiction
addresses government in the sunshine and open meetings in its state constitution. See FLA.
CONST. art. 1, § 24.
143. See Open Records Appeal, Ky. Att’y Gen. Op. 92-32 (1992); see also N.D. Att’y
Gen. Op. 2005-0-19 (Nov. 22, 2005) (stating that North Dakota’s open meeting law applies
to the State Bar Board even though courts are exempt).
144. See, e.g., Application of Open Meeting Laws to Board of Trustees Created Under
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-952.01, Ariz. Att’y Gen. Op. 107-001 (2007).
145. See, e.g., id.; N.D. Att’y Gen. Op. 2005-0-19 (Nov. 22, 2005); N.D. Att’y Gen.
Op. 90-04 (Jan. 23, 1990) (stating that North Dakota’s open meetings law applies to the State
Bar Board); N.D. Att’y Gen. Op. 2014-0-02 (Feb. 3, 2014).
146. See, e.g., MINN. BAR ADMISSION R. 3(C)(1) (“Board [of Law Examiners’]
meetings are open to the public . . . .”).
147. See In re Petition of Ravnitzky, C8-97-2104 (Minn. Dec. 23, 1997) (deferring
consideration of a petition for an order amending the Rules of the Supreme Court for
Admission to the Bar because the board of law examiners planned to submit a petition to
amend those rules).
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contact, via phone or email communication, with jurisdictional
representatives in order to verify whether the lawyer-licensing
entity regularly holds meetings that are open to the public.

III. STUDY FINDINGS
This section reports findings on how lawyer-licensing
entities across fifty-one United States jurisdictions use
rulemaking procedures and transparency practices when adopting
new bar admission rules.

A. Use of Rulemaking Procedures
Findings on the use of rulemaking procedures include the
extent to which lawyer-licensing entities (1) use notice-andcomment rulemaking procedures as a matter of actual practice;
(2) provide an express avenue for outsiders to petition the entity
for a rule change; and (3) have an express declaratory relief
procedure in place for stakeholders to use when the meaning or
application of a rule is unclear.

1. Findings on Notice-and-Comment

Lawyer-Licensing Entitites that Use Noticeand-Comment Rulemaking Procedures
35

33

30
25
20
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0
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Number of United States Jurisdictions Studied
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This study’s findings show that thirty-three out of fifty-one
jurisdictions use notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures
when changing lawyer-licensing rules and that eighteen
jurisdictions do not. 148 Stated another way, sixty-five percent of
lawyer-licensing entities provide advance notice of proposed rule
changes and solicit comment from others before changing rules
that govern bar admission. 149
Jurisdictions that use notice-and-comment rulemaking
procedures do so either (1) pursuant to express authority that
directs the use of notice-and-comment rulemaking; 150 or (2) out
of voluntary practice. 151
Twenty-two of the thirty-three
jurisdictions that use notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures
do so under express authority. 152 To illustrate, Alaska has a
148. See infra notes 152, 159.
149. See id.
150. See infra note 152.
151. See infra note 159.
152. See ALASKA BAR R. 62 §§ 5, 7 (requiring thirty days’ advance notice and giving
interested persons the opportunity to comment in oral or written form); ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 28
pmbl., (A)-(D) (stating that the policy of the court is to provide public notice and opportunity
for comment regarding proposed changes to court rules); CAL. STATE BAR R. 1.10(A)
(setting forth a presumptive period of forty-five days to receive public comment on proposed
rule changes); COLO. BAR ADMISSION R. 202.2; Adopted & Proposed Rule Changes, COLO.
JUD. BRANCH: SUP. CT., https://www.courts.state.co.us /Courts /Supreme_Court
/Rule_Changes.cfm [https://perma.cc/3H8E-LVBC]; CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 1-9(b)
(requiring notice to be given in the Connecticut Law Journal and a time period for comment);
FLA. STATE BAR R. 1-12.1(d)-(e) (requiring a period of notice and comment prior to the
adoption of proposed rules); HAW. SUP. CT. R. 17(g) (requiring the Hawaii Supreme Court
to give the Board of Directors of the Hawaii state bar ninety days’ prior written notice of
proposed changes and granting the Board of Directors discretion to determine whether the
proposed changes will “be the subject of a public hearing, written comment, or other means
of public or member participation”); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-1.5-1 (West 2017) (declaring
that official actions of public agencies must be conducted and taken openly in order to fully
inform the people of Indiana); 2017 Ind. Legis. Serv. 1 (West) (defining public agency as
including any “board, commission, department, agency, authority, or other entity . . .
exercising a portion of the executive, administrative, or legislative power of the state.”);
Order Amending Trial Rule 80, No. 94S00-1701-MS-5 (Ind. May 19, 2017) (requiring the
Supreme Court Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure to publish all proposed
amendments and give thirty days for written comment by the public); IND. TRIAL P. R. 81(B)
(requiring a court or administrative district to give notice to the bar and public of the
proposed local or administrative rules, the time period for comment, the address to which
comments should be sent, and the proposed effective date); IOWA CODE ANN. § 602.4202(1)
(West 2017) (requiring the supreme court to submit proposed rules to the legislative council
for notice and comment prior to adoption); Order on Rules Oversight and Rulemaking
Processes, No. JB-05-27 (A. 2-16) (Me. Feb. 8, 2016) (requiring the Maine Supreme Court
to provide notice of proposed rule changes and solicit written comments for a fourteen-day
period, absent extraordinary circumstances); MICH. CT. R. 1-201(A) (stating that, prior to

2017

DO IT IN THE SUNSHINE

637

statute that specifies the exact procedure whereby rules are to be
created and amended. 153 Alaska’s law states that the Board of
Governors, individual members of the Board of Governors, and
members of the Alaska bar can initiate the rulemaking process. 154
However, the law also states that a thirty-day notice of a proposed
rule change must be given before the rule can be recommended
for adoption. 155 Notice is to be provided by publication in the
Alaska Bar Brief or other bar publication, physical mail delivery
to persons who have filed a request for notice, and, in some cases,
physical mail delivery to other interested parties. 156 Additionally,
the notice must include information about the time, place, and
nature of the proceeding and substantive information about the

any rule amendment adoptions, the supreme court must notify the secretary of the state bar
of Michigan and state court administrator of the proposed amendment, the manner and date
for submitting comments, and notice must be posted on the court’s website); NEB. CT. R.
§ 1-103(A)-(C) (requiring new or amended rules to be submitted to the clerk of the supreme
court, followed by outright denial or deferred action of the supreme court pending notice and
comment to the public); NEB. CT. R. § 1-104(A) (stating that new rules, amended rules, and
rules awaiting comment from the public shall be published on the court’s website); N.H. SUP.
CT. R. 51(e) (requiring the clerk of the supreme court to publish any proposed rules and
invite comments for thirty days); N.M. SUP. CT. R. 23-106.1(A)-(B), (D) (requiring all rulechange requests to be filed with the clerk of the supreme court, which are then forwarded to
the appropriate committee and published in March of each year with a thirty-day comment
period); N.M. SUP. CT. R. 23-106 (A)-(J) (detailing the various committees which the
supreme court may appoint for rulemaking purposes); N.D. R. P. §§ 3, 7 (stating that within
forty-five days of receiving a rule petition, the supreme court shall either refer the petition to
the appropriate committee or allow for notice and comment); 201 PA. CODE R. 103(a) (West
2017) (requiring, absent exigent circumstances, a notice-and-comment period prior to the
adoption of any new or amended rules); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 16-3-5.1 (West 2017) (giving
thirty days’ advance notice in a publication of general circulation among active members of
the bar or online prior to a rule being adopted); TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-3-405 (West 2017)
(stating all rules adopted by the supreme court shall be published in a manner deemed
appropriate by the court); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 551.041 (West 2017) (requiring
governmental bodies to give written notice of the “date, hour, place, and subject” of
upcoming meetings); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 82.003(a) (West 2017) (stating that the
Texas “Board of Law Examiners is subject to . . . Chapter 551”); UTAH JUD. ADMIN. CODE
R. 11-105(3)(C) (requiring notice and a forty-five-day comment period before an adoption
of a proposed rule); VA. R. SUP. CT. part 6, § 4, ¶ 10-2(C) (requiring a period for notice and
a thirty-day comment period); Public Notice and Opportunity to Comment Relative to
Proposed Rules or Changes in Rules, Vt. Admin. Order No. 11, §§ 2-3 (effective April 18,
2003) (requiring a notice-and-comment period prior to essentially any adoption of proposed
rules or amendments).
153. ALASKA BAR R. 62, § 1.
154. ALASKA BAR R. 62, §§ 2, 3.
155. ALASKA BAR R. 62, § 5.
156. ALASKA BAR R. 62, § 5.
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proposed rule or proposed rule change. 157 The law requires that
“interested persons or their authorized representatives, or both”
be given an opportunity to provide comment. 158 In this manner,
Alaska, via express authority, promulgates rules according to
detailed notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures.
In contrast to the twenty-two jurisdictions that have express
provisions about lawyer-licensing entities using notice-andcomment rulemaking procedures, there are twelve jurisdictions
that follow notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures out of
voluntary practice. 159 For example, in the District of Columbia,
157. ALASKA BAR R. 62, § 6.
158. ALASKA BAR R. 62, § 7.
159. See Court of Appeals Notices, D.C. CTS., https://www.dccourts.gov/court-ofappeals/about-court-appeals/notices [https://perma.cc/8778-MHQH] (providing notice of
proposed rule changes and an avenue for comment); Rules Adopted by the Supreme Court,
KAN. JUD. BRANCH, http://www.kscourts.org/rules/default.asp [https://perma.cc/3KFF42N9] (evidencing access to comment on proposed or amended rules); Standing Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Proposed Rules Changes and Recent Rules Orders, MD.
CTS., http:// www.mdcourts.gov /rules /ruleschanges. html [https://perma.cc/SC6X-S76J]
(evidencing access to comment on proposed or amended rules); Rule Changes & Invitations
to Comment, MASS.GOV: MASS. CT. SYS., http://www.mass.gov /courts /case-legal-res
/rules-of-court
/rule-changes-invitations-comment/
[https://perma.cc/H2ZE-U9HM]
(showing a clear avenue for notice and comment on proposed rule changes, including a
change to the rules of the Board of Bar Examiners); Case Management System, MINN. APP.
CTS.,
http://macsnc.
courts.state.mn.us
/ctrack
/view
/publicCaseMaintenance.do?csNameID=69135&csInstanceID=75906
[https://perma.cc
/R3DJ-Y3TC] (providing access to all filings related to the amendment or adoption of rules
regulating
bar
admission);
New
Rules,
MONT.
JUD.
BRANCH,
http://courts.mt.gov/supreme/new_rules (presenting orders of the supreme court amending
rules to the bar, each of which states that the rule was or will be distributed for public
comment prior to adoption); Advisory Comm. on the Unif. Bar Examination, Overview, NY
STATE UNIFIED CT. SYS., http://www.nycourts.gov /ip /bar-exam / [https://perma.cc/9CV9X8CA] (“In fulfillment of its mission and in the interests of transparency, the committee held
four public hearings and informational presentations throughout the state, posted a podcast
with the chair of the New York State Board of Law Examiners, disseminated ‘tweets’ on the
court system’s Twitter account to notify interested parties of upcoming hearings and
informational sessions, created this web site, and promptly posted transcripts, witness
statements and other comments received from those in favor of as well as those opposed to
the proposal.”); Proposed Rule Amendments, SUP. CT. OF OHIO & OHIO JUD. SYS.,
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/RuleAmendments/
[https://perma.cc/8PYB-HHEB]
(publicizing rules that are open for public comment); Final Rule Amendments, THE SUP. CT.
OF OHIO & THE OHIO JUD. SYS., http:// www.supremecourt.ohio.gov /RuleAmendments
/Archive.aspx [https://perma.cc/A345-JJTV] (indicating that past amendments to the baradmission rules were published for public comment); Order Adopting the Uniform Bar
Examination, No. 2016-01-2101 (S.C. Jan. 21, 2016), http:// www.judicial.state.sc.us
/courtOrders /display Order.cfm?order No=2016-01-21-01 [https://perma.cc/64H9-S9FA]
(“[A]fter consultation with the Board of Law Examiners and representatives of the South
Carolina Bar, the Charleston School of Law, the University of South Carolina School of
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the court of appeals website provides an opportunity for notice
and comment on proposed rule changes. 160 Website visitors can
click on the proposed-rule-change links, and the visitor will be
directed to the desired order that provides the proposed rule or
text of the proposed rule amendment and instructions for
submitting comments. 161 Thus, the District of Columbia
exercises notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures as a matter
of practice. However, thorough research did not produce any
express provisions requiring the court to follow such procedures.
While adhering to notice-and-comment rulemaking
procedures as a matter of voluntary practice is superior to
changing bar-admission rules without any advance notice or
opportunity to be heard, voluntary practices are subject to
selective use. Thus, less than half of our country’s lawyerlicensing entities have express notice-and-comment procedures in
place. 162
In addition to confirming the number of lawyer-licensing
entities that use notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures, this
study’s findings demonstrate that the substance of the various
rulemaking procedures and the discretion to forego using the
Law, and the National Conference of Bar Examiners”); Requests for Public Comment, W.
VA. JUDICIARY, http://www.courtswv.gov /legal-community/requests-for-comment.html
[https://perma.cc/AW9E-ZDPY] (posting notice and soliciting comments on proposed rules,
including some related to bar admission, stating that “[c]omments from the public, the bench,
and the bar are important to the judicial rule making process”); Recent Rules Orders, W. VA.
JUDICIARY, http:// www.courtswv.gov /legal-community /recent- rules- orders.html
[https://perma.cc/Z6QK-RHYK] (identifying proposed bar-admission rules that are
currently open for comment or that have been previously adopted after a period for
comment); In re Matter of Publication of Supreme Court Orders, No. 12-09 (Wis. Aug. 7,
2015),
https://www.wicourts.gov
/sc
/rulhear
/DisplayDocument.pdf?
content=pdf&seqNo=146023 [https://perma.cc/QTL4-KSF3] (providing an example of a
petition filed proposing rule changes which were later opened for public comment). Compare
COLO. BAR. ADMISSION. R. 202.2 (“The [Supreme Court] Advisory Committee shall
recommend to the Supreme Court proposed changes or addition to the rules . . . governing
admission to the practice of law.”), with Adopted & Proposed Rule Changes, COLO. JUD.
BRANCH, https://www.courts.state.co.us /Courts /Supreme_Court/Rule_Changes.cfm
[https://perma.cc/XD4X-SXDF] (posting notice of proposed rule changes and inviting public
comment).
160. See Court of Appeals Notices, D.C. CTS., http://www.dccourts.gov /internet
/appellate/notices/main.jsf [https://perma.cc/J758-4HRZ].
161. See id. For an example of an amendment passed using the notice-and-comment
method, see Order Amending Rule XI of the District of Columbia Rules Governing the Bar,
No. M-251-15 (D.C. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.dccourts.gov/court-ofappeals/orders [https://perma.cc/JCN2-6Y9V].
162. Supra note 152.
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procedures varies widely across jurisdictions. Selected variations
are highlighted below.
As a preliminary matter, lawyer-licensing entities tend to
follow one of two approaches when initiating rulemaking
proceedings. In the first approach, lawyer-licensing entities
promulgate rules during a predetermined cycle of time that lasts
one year or longer before the cycle repeats itself. 163 For example,
in Maine all proposed rule changes must be submitted to the
Maine Supreme Judicial Court by the first day of May in any
given year. 164 Proposed amendments submitted in advance of this
deadline are handled by the Court during the summer months,
which allows adopted changes to take effect by September. 165 In
the second approach, lawyer-licensing entities engage in
rulemaking action at any time of the year. 166
Furthermore, the length of time for advance notice of a
proposed rule change varies considerably from one lawyerlicensing entity to another. 167 Some jurisdictions, like Hawaii,
provide ninety days’ advance notice to the state bar’s board of
directors, who then have the authority to provide the public with
notice of potential rule changes and an opportunity to express
their opinion on the proposals. 168 In Utah, the rulemaking entity
provides a forty-five-day comment period. 169 In jurisdictions like
Alaska, Indiana, New Hampshire, and New Mexico, public notice
is posted thirty days in advance of any formal administrative
action. 170 But some jurisdictions, like Vermont, require notice of

163. See Rules Oversight and Rulemaking Processes, Admin. Order No. JB-05-27 (A.
2-16) (Me. Feb. 8, 2016); ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 28 pmbl. (adopting an annual rulemaking cycle
to implement rule changes); N.M. SUP. CT. R. 23-106.1(B).
164. Rules Oversight and Rulemaking Processes, Admin. Order No. JB-05-27 (A. 216) (Me. Feb. 8, 2016).
165. See id.
166. See Public Notice and Opportunity to Comment Relative to Proposed Rules or
Changes in Rules, Vt. Admin. Order No. 11 (effective April 18, 2003).
167. Compare HAW. SUP. CT. R. 17(g) (requiring ninety days’ advance notice to the
Board of Directors of the Hawai’i state bar and thirty days’ notice to the public), with DEL.
BD. BAR EXAM’RS. R. 4(a) (requiring only two days’ notice before a meeting of the board).
168. HAW. SUP. CT. R. 17(g).
169. See UTAH JUD. ADMIN. CODE R. 11-103(2).
170. ALASKA BAR R. 62, § 5; IND. TRIAL P. R. 80(D) (requiring the Supreme Court
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure to publish all amendments and give a thirtyday period for written comment); N.H. SUP. CT. R. 51(e)(2); N.M. SUP. CT. R. 23106.1(B)(2).
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proposed rule changes without specifying the amount of time.171
Still other jurisdictions provide notice a mere two days in advance
of administrative action. 172
In addition to length of time for advance notice, jurisdictions
vary in the manner in which comments are received. 173 Some
jurisdictions allow only written comment; 174 other jurisdictions
allow comment to be contributed in either oral or written form,
depending on whether a meeting is held. 175 Many lawyerlicensing entities with rulemaking power exercise discretion with
respect to whether a public hearing on a proposed rule change will
occur. 176 When those entities decide not to hold a public hearing,
all comments must be submitted in writing. 177
Discretion regarding whether to hold a public hearing is not
infrequently supplemented by discretion to forego notice-andcomment rulemaking procedures altogether. 178 In jurisdictions
where the amount of discretion given is this broad, procedural
process safeguards preserved by notice-and-comment rulemaking
procedures at times disappear. When this happens, jurisdictions
that promulgate rules according to notice-and-comment
procedures transform into jurisdictions that conduct agency
operations behind closed doors. Thus, the jurisdictions that only
voluntarily hold open meetings can become more akin to the
group of seventeen other jurisdictions that do not use notice-andcomment rulemaking procedures when promulgating lawyerlicensing rules and regulations.
The next section reports findings on whether lawyerlicensing entities have rules that allow those outside the agency
171. Public Notice and Opportunity to Comment Relative to Proposed Rules or
Changes in Rules, Vt. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order No. 11 (effective Apr. 18, 2003).
172. See, e.g., DEL. BD. OF BAR EXAM’RS R. 4(a) (stating that meetings of the board
can be called upon two days’ notice).
173. UTAH JUD. ADMIN. CODE R. 11-103; Public Notice and Opportunity to Comment
Relative to Proposed Rules or Changes in Rules, Vt. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order No. 11 (effective
Apr. 18, 2003).
174. See, e.g., UTAH JUD. ADMIN. CODE R. 11-103.
175. See, e.g., Public Notice and Opportunity to Comment Relative to Proposed Rules
or Changes in Rules, Vt. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order No. 11 (effective Apr. 18, 2003) (stating
that members of the bar or public “may reserve time in which to make oral comments upon
the proposals” if a hearing is held).
176. Id; see also NEB. CT. R. § 1-103(D).
177. See Public Notice and Opportunity to Comment Relative to Proposed Rules or
Changes in Rules, Vt. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order No. 11 (effective Apr. 18, 2003).
178. See NEB. CT. R. § 1-103(B)(1).
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to petition the licensing entity to change or repeal an existing rule
or adopt a new rule.

2. Findings on Avenues to Petition

40
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Lawyer-Licensing Entities that Provide
Outsiders an Avenue to Petition for Rule
Changes
37
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Yes
No
Number of United States Jurisdictions Studied

For purposes of this article, jurisdictions are considered to
provide outsiders an avenue to petition for rule changes when
there is an authority specifically stating that someone outside the
rulemaking entity can petition for rule changes. Contrastingly,
jurisdictions that might read random petitions sent to them,
merely based upon a potentially momentary and entirely
voluntary basis have not been categorized as providing outsiders
an avenue to petition. Thus, while a jurisdiction may be
considered as having notice-and-comment procedures by
voluntarily following those practices, for a jurisdiction to be
considered as providing an avenue to petition, there must be
express authority allowing for petition. An example of such
express authority is New Hampshire’s rule, which specifically
states that anyone can petition the court for a rule change and
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instructs petitioners what information their petition should
include. 179
The data collected on petition shows that fourteen of fiftyone jurisdictions allow those outside the agency to initiate
rulemaking proceedings. 180 This means that twenty-seven
percent of jurisdictions allow outsiders to have a direct say in the
regulation of lawyer-licensing. In contrast, thirty-seven of fiftyone jurisdictions do not provide an avenue for outsiders to petition
for purposes of making changes to administrative rule. 181 In other
words, roughly seventy-three percent of jurisdictions do not allow
179. N.H. SUP. CT. R. 51(c)(1) (allowing anyone to initiate the rulemaking process
and instructing petitioners what information their petitions should contain).
180. See ALASKA BAR R. 62, § 3 (allowing members of the Alaska Bar and members
of the Board of Governors to petition for rule changes); ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 28(A)(1) (allowing
anyone to initiate the rulemaking process); FLA. STATE BAR R. 1-12.1(b) (allowing members
of the Florida Bar in good standing and members of sections and committees of the Florida
Bar to initiate the rulemaking process); Order Amending Trial Rule 80, No. 0009 (Ind. May
19, 2017) (stating that rule-amendment proposals are to be presented to the Supreme Court’s
Chief Administrative Officer and that the applicable form can be found at the court’s
website); Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, IND. JUD. BRANCH,
http://www.in.gov/judiciary/admin/2432.htm [https://perma.cc/6BFZ-QQY9] (providing
access to the court’s proposed-rule-amendment form); Order on Rules Oversight and
Rulemaking Processes, No. JB-05-27 (A. 2-16) (Me. Feb. 8, 2016) (stating that rule
amendments can originate with “any source”); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 480.05, 480.054 (West
2017) (stating that the supreme court has the power to promulgate bar-admission rules and
has the discretion to grant hearings upon receiving a petition from any person); Order
Promulgating Amendments to the Rules for Admission to the Bar, ADM10-8008 (Minn. Jan.
24, 2017) (demonstrating that the supreme court considers petitions from those outside the
rule-promulgating entity, such as the Minnesota State Board of Law Examiners); MONT.
CONST. art. VII, § 2(3) (giving the supreme court the power to promulgate bar-admission
rules); MONT. SUP. CT. INTERNAL OPERATING R. § 6(1) (allowing outsiders to apply for rule
changes); In re Petition to Adopt Uniform Bar Examination, No. AF 11-0244 (Mont. July 3,
2012) (demonstrating that the supreme court considers petitions from those outside the
rulemaking entity, such as the Montana Board of Law Examiners and Committee on
Character and Fitness); NEB. CT. R. § 1-103(A) (allowing any interested party to petition for
rule changes “unless an existing rule contains specific language” stating that a different
procedure is to be followed); NEB. ADMIN. R. & REGS. § 002.01 (“Any person may petition
an agency requesting the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of a rule or regulation.”); N.H.
SUP. CT. R. 51(c)(1) (allowing anyone to initiate the rulemaking process); N.M. SUP. CT. R.
23-106.1(A) (allowing outsiders to apply for rule changes); N.D. R. P. R. § 3.1 (allowing
anyone to initiate the rulemaking process); UTAH JUD. ADMIN. CODE R. 11-105(2) (“The
Supreme Court shall consider petitions and petitioners’ memoranda and adopt, modify, or
reject the proposals made and enter an appropriate order.”); VA. R. SUP. CT. pt. 6, § 4, ¶ 102(B) (allowing the Standing Committee on Legal Ethics to suggest rule changes); Supreme
Court
Rules:
How
to
File
a
Rule
Petition,
WIS.
CT.
SYS.,
https://www.wicourts.gov/scrules/petitionfile.htm [https://perma.cc/YP2Q-VVMS] (stating
that anyone can initiate the rulemaking process).
181. See supra note 180.
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those outside the rulemaking entity to initiate the rulemaking
process. Thus, nearly two-thirds of jurisdictions deny the right to
petition for rule creation, changes, and repeal. 182
Jurisdictions that offer an avenue for outsiders to petition for
rule changes vary with respect to whom they explicitly allow to
petition. 183 Many jurisdictions specifically state that they allow
“anyone,” “any person,” “any source,” or “any interested party”
to petition for rule changes. 184 In contrast, a few jurisdictions
couple the ability to petition for rule changes with membership in
a select segment of the population. 185 For example, Florida links
the right to petition for rule changes to membership of the Florida
State Bar. 186 However, it is important to note that even these
jurisdictions supply some means of petition, unlike the vast
majority of their peers, and thereby provide an increased measure
of oversight.

182. See id.
183. See infra notes 184-85.
184. ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 28(A)(1) (allowing anyone “interested in the adoption,
amendment, or repeal of a court rule” to initiate the rulemaking process); Order on Rules
Oversight and Rulemaking Process, No. JB-05-27 (A. 2-16) (Me. Feb. 8, 2016) (stating that
rule amendments can originate with “any source”); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 480.05, 480.054
(West 2017) (stating that the supreme court has the power to promulgate bar-admission rules
and the discretion to grant hearings upon receiving a petition from any person); Order
Promulgating Amendments to the Rules for Admission to the Bar, ADM10-8008 (Minn. Jan.
24, 2017) (demonstrating that the supreme court considers petitions from those outside the
rule-promulgating entity, such as the Minnesota State Board of Law Examiners); MONT.
CONST. art. VII, § 2(3) (giving the supreme court the power to promulgate bar-admission
rules); NEB. CT. R. § 1-103(A) (allowing any interested party to petition for rule changes
“unless an existing rule contains specific language” stating that a different procedure is to be
followed); NEB. ADMIN. R. & REGS. § 002.01 (“Any person may petition an agency
requesting the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of a rule or regulation.”); N.H. SUP. CT.
R. 51(c)(1) (allowing anyone to suggest rule changes); N.D. R. P. R. § 3.1 (allowing anyone
to petition for rule changes); Supreme Court Rules: How to File a Rule Petition, WIS. CT.
SYS., https://www.wicourts.gov/scrules/petitionfile.htm (stating that anyone can initiate the
rulemaking process).
185. See ALASKA BAR R. 62, §§ 1, 3 (stating that the rule provides an avenue “whereby
the Board of Governors of the Alaska Bar and the Alaska Bar” can directly petition for rule
changes); FLA. STATE BAR R. 1-12.1(b) (stating that members of the Florida Bar in good
standing and members of sections and committees of the Florida Bar can initiate the
rulemaking process); VA. R. SUP. CT. pt. 6, § 4, ¶ 10-2(B) (allowing the Standing Committee
on Legal Ethics to suggest rule changes).
186. See FLA. STATE BAR R. 1-12.1(b) (stating that members of the Florida Bar in
good standing and members of sections and committees of the Florida Bar can initiate the
rulemaking process).

2017

DO IT IN THE SUNSHINE

645

3. Findings on Avenues for Declaratory Relief
Research findings regarding whether a jurisdiction’s lawyerlicensing entity provides rules instructing people on how to
request declaratory relief are noticeably different than the data
collected in the preceding sections. No lawyer-licensing entities
have express rules, regulations, or procedures by which people
outside the agency can seek clarification on the validity, meaning,
or application of an existing rule. 187
Declaratory relief procedures help provide oversight
regarding agency rulemaking. 188
In addition, while all
jurisdictions provide statutory avenues to seek declaratory relief
from courts in the context of rules of civil procedure, when
dealing with administrative entities there is value in having
procedural rules of engagement explicitly expressed within that
particular agency’s governing rules. 189

B. Holding Open Meetings

30
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Lawyer-Licensing Entitites that Regularly
Hold Meetings that are Open to the Public
23

28
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5
0
Yes
No
Number of United States Jurisdictions Studied
187. I reached this conclusion after studying a wide variety of sources for each state,
including legislative statutes, rules of state supreme courts, board of bar examiners’ rules,
and bar-association rules.
188. 39 GERALD A. MCDONOUGH, MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE SERIES:
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & PRACTICE § 12:58, Westlaw (updated Aug. 2017); see also
Powell, supra note 111, at 294.
189. See, e.g., MISS. R. CIV. P. 57(a) (“Courts . . . may declare rights, status, and other
legal relations regardless of whether further relief is or could be claimed.”); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 33 cmt. a (AM. LAW. INST. 1982) (noting that “[v]irtually all”
states empower their courts to grant declaratory relief).
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The second metric upon which data was collected is the
extent to which lawyer-licensing entities hold meetings that are
open to the public. The findings revealed here respond to the
following question: Does this lawyer-licensing entity regularly
hold meetings that are open to the public as a matter of practice?
In order to qualify as an open meetings adherent, a lawyerlicensing entity must affirmatively demonstrate that it holds open
meetings as a matter of actual practice, regardless of whether it
technically falls within its state open meetings statute. In other
words, even if the statute appears to apply to the jurisdiction’s
lawyer-licensing entity, this study treated the entity as a nonopen-meetings entity if it made no affirmative indications that it
regularly holds meetings that are open to the public.
The findings show that twenty-three out of fifty-one
jurisdictions regularly hold open meetings. 190 As with the other
metrics measured, a range exists in open meeting practices. 191
190. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 08.08.075 (West 2017) (providing that the Board of
Governors’ meetings are subject to the Opening Meeting Law of Alaska); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 38-431(6), 431.01(A) (West 2017) (stating any meeting of a public body shall be
open to the public and defining public body to include “all quasi-judicial bodies”); CAL. BUS.
& PROF. CODE §§ 6010, 6026.5(a), 6026.7 (West 2017) (requiring that every meeting of the
board of the state bar must be open to the public, unless an enumerated exception exists);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-6-402(2)(a) (West 2017) (mandating that all multimember
meetings of any “state public body” be open to the public if the public body is to discuss
“public business” or take “formal action”); Lanes v. State Auditor’s Office, 797 P.2d 764,
766 (Colo. App. 1990) (finding that the State Personnel Board is subject to the open meeting
law even when it acts in a quasi-judicial capacity); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-200, 225(a) (West 2017) (providing that all meetings of all public agencies shall be open to the
public, and defining public agencies to include any judicial entity engaged in an
administrative function); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 74-202, -203(1), -204 (West 2017); 5 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 120/1, § 1, 120/1.02, 120/2, § 2(a)-(c) (West 2017); Ill. Att’y Gen. Op.
99-005 (Mar. 15, 1999); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 5-14-1.5-1, 2, 2.1, 3 (West 2017); MD. CODE.
ANN., GEN. PROVISIONS §§ 3-101, 102, 301 (West 2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A,
§§ 18, 20(a), 21 (West 2017); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 13D.01(1)(a) (West 2017); MINN. BAR
ADMISSION R. 3(C)(1); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 91-A:1-a, A:2 (2017); N.H. SUP. CT R.
42, 51; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 143-318.10(a)-(b) (West 2017); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN.
§ 44-04-19 (West 2017); N.D. Att’y Gen. Op. 90-04 (Jan. 23, 1990); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
25, §§ 302-04 (West 2017); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 192.610-630(1), .690 (West 2017); Or.
Att’y Gen. Op. 2014-02 (Dec. 10, 2014); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-25-1 (West 2017); TEX.
GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 82.003, 551.002(West 2017); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 52-4-102(2), -103
(West 2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3701, 3705.7, 3707(A) (West 2017); VA. SUP. CT. R.
pt. 6, § 4, ¶¶ 8-9; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 42.30.020-.030 (West 2017); WASH. GEN. CT.
R. 12.2; W. VA. CODE § 6-9A-1, -2(7) (West 2017); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 19.81(2), .82(1)
(West 2017); WIS. SUP. CT. R. 10.01, .02.
191. See infra notes 192-93.
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For example, out of the twenty-three jurisdictions that regularly
hold open meetings, seventeen 192 of those jurisdictions do so
pursuant to an express statute or rule, leaving six jurisdictions
regularly holding open meetings out of voluntary practice. 193
Twenty-eight jurisdictions do not regularly hold open
meetings. 194
192. The seventeen jurisdictions are: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon,
South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia.
193. The six jurisdictions are: California, Connecticut, Indiana, New Hampshire,
Utah, & Wisconsin.
194. ALA. CODE § 36-25A-1 to -2 (West 2017); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 25-19-102 to 103 (Repl. 2014); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, §§ 10001-10002 (West 2017); Del. Att’y Gen.
Op. 07-IB02 (Feb. 1, 2007); Del. Att’y Gen. Op. 95-I001 (Jan. 18, 1995); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 2-574 to -575 (West 2017); Telephone Interview with Jharonte James, Office Receptionist,
Fla. Supreme Court Clerk (Mar. 16, 2016) (stating that Florida does not hold open meetings);
GA. CODE ANN. § 50-14-1 (West 2017); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 92-1, -2, -6 (West 2017);
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 21.1-.2 (West 2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-4317 to -4318 (West
2017); LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 42:12-:13 (West 2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 15.261-.262
(2017); MISS. CODE. ANN. §§ 25-41-3, -5 (West 2017); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 610.010-.011,
.020 (West 2017); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 2-3-201 to -203 (West 2017); NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 84-1408 to -1410 (West 2017); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 241.010, .015 (West 2017);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-8 (West 2017) (excluding the judicial branch from those “public
bodies” subject to the state’s open-public-meetings act); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-15-1 (West
2017); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 100, 102, 108 (McKinney 2017); 65 PA. STAT. AND CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 703-704 (West 2017); 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 42-46-3 to -5 (West 2017);
Roberts v. City of Cranston Zoning Bd., 448 A.2d 779, 780 (R.I. 1982); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
1, § 312 (West 2017); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-4-402, -403, -405 (West 2017); see also
Telephone Interview with Joel Biron, Deputy Clerk, Maine Supreme Judicial Court (March
23, 2016). In Kentucky, the Office of Bar Admissions possesses the “power to adopt and
amend rules and regulations” governing admission to the bar. KY. SUP. CT. R. 2.000. The
Office of Bar Admissions was created by the Kentucky Supreme Court and includes the
Kentucky Board of Bar Examiners and the Character and Fitness Committee. Id.
Furthermore, the Kentucky Constitution grants the exclusive authority to regulate admission
to the bar to the judiciary branch, KY. CONST. § 116, and expressly prohibits one department
of the commonwealth of Kentucky from exercising any power belonging to another
department. See KY. CONST. § 28. The Kentucky Open Meetings of Public Agencies law
applies to “public agencies,” but public agencies as defined under the statute neither
expressly includes nor excludes judicial-department entities. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 61.805(2), .810 (West 2017). Indeed, the only statute in Kentucky which defines “public
agencies” to include courts is the Public Records law, see KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 61.870(1)(e) (West 2017), but this statute’s constitutionality has been questioned as to its
inclusion of courts within the definition of “public agency.” See Ex parte Farley, 570 S.W.2d
617, 624-25 (Ky. 1978); accord Ex parte Auditor of Public Accounts, 609 S.W.2d 682, 68384, 686, 688-89 (Ky. 1980) (voiding state auditor’s power to audit Kentucky Bar Association
since state constitutional amendment had removed subject of attorney regulation from
legislative control and placed it within the Judicial Department, of which bar association was
an integral part). Thus, one of two conclusions is plausible. Either “public agencies” as
defined under the Open Meetings of Public Agencies law does not include courts, as the
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Important to note here is the difficulty in finding the answer
to this metric by assessing language from state open meeting
statutes. For example, in some states, open meeting statutes do
not expressly exclude courts or the judicial branch of government
and are worded broadly enough to appear on their face to apply
to judicial branch entities. 195 Kentucky’s Open Meetings of
Public Agencies law applies to “public agencies,” and “public
agencies” as defined under the statute neither expressly includes
nor excludes judicial-department entities. 196

V. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
This section discusses this study’s findings on the lawyerlicensing entities researched. Lawyer-licensing entities are
Kentucky legislature expressly includes courts when it intends to do so, or the law does
portend to include courts as “public agencies” and is of suspect constitutionality. In any
event, no evidence suggests that the Office of Bar Admissions holds meetings that are open
to the public. In Ohio, no express court rule or evidence of actual practice suggests the Ohio
Supreme Court or any of the judicially created lawyer-licensing entities hold regular
meetings that are open to the public. Although the open meetings statute does not expressly
exclude the judicial branch from its reach, see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22 (West 2017),
the only judicial branch entity expressly included as being subject to the act is “[a] court of
jurisdiction of a sanitary district organized wholly for the purpose of providing a water
supply for domestic, municipal, and public use when meeting for” specified purposes. See
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22 (West 2017). This statutory feature, along with additional
evidence, confirms that the Ohio Supreme Court and judicially created lawyer-licensing
entities do not consider themselves subject to sunshine laws. See State ex rel. Richfield v.
Laria, 4 N.E.3d 1040, 1042 (Ohio 2014) (finding Ohio’s Public Records Act inapplicable to
obtaining court records); Telephone Interview with John VanNorman, Senior Policy and
Research Counsel, Supreme Court of Ohio (Mar. 6, 2017). In South Carolina, neither the
Board of Law Examiners nor the Supreme Court holds regular meetings that are open to the
public. See Email from Michael Virzi, Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, to Author (Mar.
8, 2016) (on file with author). In Tennessee, the Public Meetings statute applies to any
“governing body,” see TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-44-102(a) (West 2016), a term that has been
interpreted to “include any board, commission, committee, agency, authority or any other
body, by whatever name, whose origin and authority may be traced to State, City or County
legislative action,” Dorrier v. Dark, 537 S.W.2d 888, 892 (Tenn. 1976), but has not been
expressly extended to governmental or public bodies within the judicial branch of
government. The Supreme Court of Tennessee controls admission to practice law within the
state and promulgates the rules related to lawyer licensing. See, e.g., TENN. SUP. CT. R. 7.
The Tennessee Supreme Court created the Board of Law Examiners as part of the judicial
branch of government. See id. The Board of Law Examiners has the authority to adopt
“statements of policy and procedure” related to its task of issuing certificates of eligibility to
applicants seeking admission to practice law in Tennessee. See TENN. SUP. CT. R. 7 §§ 1.02,
12.05.
195. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.805(2) (West 2017).
196. See id.
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evaluated based on the extent to which they use standard
rulemaking procedures and transparency practices when making
changes to bar-admission rules.

A. Discussion of Study Findings
As set forth above, none of the fifty-one jurisdictions
researched currently has an express provision that provides
stakeholders with instructions on how to seek declaratory relief
about the meaning or application of an existing rule. 197 This
finding is troubling. A declaratory relief mechanism is neither
difficult to establish nor a foreign concept to lawyer-licensing
entities. 198
At least one jurisdiction previously utilized
declaratory relief before abandoning the ideal rulemaking
function. 199 The jurisdiction’s previous procedure provides an
excellent example of how a jurisdiction could provide for a
declaratory relief mechanism. Essentially, a declaratory relief
mechanism can be established by setting forth a provision that
grants stakeholders the right to request a declaratory ruling from
the relevant lawyer-licensing entity. 200 A sample provision could
read as follows: “any person substantially affected by a statute
administered or rule promulgated by the Board of Law Examiners
may request a declaratory ruling as to either: whether or how the
rule applies to a given factual situation or whether a particular
board rule is valid.” 201 Thereafter, the declaratory relief statute
should provide basic directives that instruct stakeholders on how
to format their request and the substantive information required
to be included in their request.
Unfortunately, no jurisdiction currently utilizes a declaratory
relief mechanism, meaning an ideal jurisdiction does not yet
exist.202 In light of this fact, the analysis set forth below is based
upon whether the jurisdiction’s lawyer-licensing entity
(1) engages in notice-and-comment rulemaking; (2) provides an
express avenue allowing outsiders to petition for a rule change;
and (3) holds meetings that are open to the public.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

See supra note 187.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 33 cmt. a (AM. LAW. INST. 1982).
See N.C. BAR R. § .1104(a) (effective 1976); N.C. BAR R. § .1400 (2017).
See N.C. BAR R. § .1104(a) (effective 1976).
See id.
See supra note 187.
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Upon evaluating each jurisdiction, I have characterized its
performance based on these three metrics and placed the
jurisdiction within one of three categories––sufficient,
questionable, and insufficient.

B. Categorizing Lawyer-Licensing Entities
By chance, approximately one-third of jurisdictions landed
into each of the three categories—sufficient, questionable, and
insufficient.

1. Sufficient
Jurisdictions within this category uniformly use notice-andcomment rulemaking procedures when making changes to baradmission rules. Lawyer-licensing entities acting within a
“sufficient” procedural due process framework also have express
avenues allowing outsiders to petition for rule changes. While
some jurisdictions categorized as sufficient regularly hold
meetings that are open to the public, others do not. The seventeen
states in the highest-ranked category of sufficient are the
following: Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Indiana, Minnesota,
New Hampshire, North Dakota, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin,
Florida, Maine, Montana, New Mexico, South Carolina,
Tennessee, and Nebraska.
Alaska and Florida serve as representative examples of
lawyer-licensing entities with sufficient use of standard
rulemaking procedures and transparency practices. Alaska
follows a model whereby the supreme court possesses and retains
sole power to adopt rules regarding bar admission, 203 but works
in tandem with a Board of Governors of the Alaska Bar, which
serves in an advisory role. 204 The Board of Governors has
authority to approve and recommend rules concerning lawyer
licensing to the supreme court. 205 Both the Board and supreme

203. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 15.
204. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 08.08.080 (a)(1) (West 2017); see also ALASKA STAT.
ANN. § 08.08.010 (West 2017) (creating the Alaska Bar Association as “an instrumentality
of the state . . . [and] referred to . . . as the Alaska Bar); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 08.08.030
(West 2017) (providing for a Board of Governors to govern the Alaska Bar).
205. ALASKA BAR R. 62, § 1.
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court use notice-and-comment procedures. 206
Notices of
proposed rule changes, along with an invitation to comment on
such proposals, are posted on the supreme court’s website. 207 To
the extent that recommendations to adopt or amend lawyerlicensing rules come by way of the Board of Governors of the
Alaska Bar, the recommended proposals are a result of a
regulatory process that sets forth specific notice-and-comment
protocols. 208 In its advisory role, the Board of Governors also has
procedures by which members of the bar can file a petition for a
rule change. 209 In Alaska, participation by way of notice-andcomment rulemaking is available to all members of the public. 210
Both the Alaska Supreme Court and the Board of Governors are
subject to open meeting requirements. 211
Jurisdictions that do not provide open meetings can still be
deemed to have sufficient rulemaking procedures. Consider
Florida, for example, which does not hold open meetings. 212 In
Florida, the power to promulgate rules regarding admission to the
practice of law resides exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
Florida Supreme Court. 213 In exercising such jurisdiction, the
Florida Supreme Court promulgated the Rules of the Supreme
Court Relating to Admissions to the Bar 214 and created the Florida
Board of Bar Examiners “to handle matters of bar admission.”215
The Florida Supreme Court provides notice of proposed rules and
amendments regarding rules for admission to the bar and invites
written comment concerning those rules. 216 Additionally, the
Rules of the Supreme Court allow for modifications through “the
206. ALASKA BAR R. 62 §§ 5, 7; Current Rules of Court, ALASKA CT. SYS.,
http://courts.alaska.gov/rules/rules.htm#comments [https://perma.cc/UTB2-6TWT].
207. Current Rules of Court, supra note 206.
208. See ALASKA BAR R. 62 §§ 5, 7.
209. See ALASKA BAR R. 62, § 3.
210. See ALASKA BAR R. 62 §§ 5, 7.
211. ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 08.08.075, 44.62.310(a) (West 2017).
212. Telephone Interview with Jharonte James, Office Receptionist, Fla. Supreme
Court Clerk (Mar. 16, 2016).
213. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 15.
214. FLA. SUP. CT. BAR ADMISSION R. 1-12.
215. FLA. BD. OF BAR EXAM’RS, https://www.floridabarexam.org /web /website.nsf
/52286AE9AD5D845185257C07005C3FE1/4185C019FBDF17AC85257C0700649F91
[https://perma.cc/4TDH-6TSK].
216. Proposed Rules (Updated 9/14/2017), FLA. SUP. CT., http:// www.
floridasupremecourt.org /decisions /proposed.shtml #admissions [https://perma.cc/6PQ7LS87].
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filing of a petition with the Supreme Court of Florida and
subsequent order by the court.” 217 Florida does not hold open
meetings. 218

2. Questionable
Based on the study findings, seventeen jurisdictions use
rulemaking procedures and transparency practices that are
sufficient in some ways but deficient in others. These
jurisdictions are labeled as “questionable” to note their dual
characteristics.
The following jurisdictions have been
categorized as questionable: California, Colorado, Maryland,
Texas, West Virginia, South Dakota, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New York, Ohio, Vermont,
Pennsylvania, and the District of Columbia. To their credit, all
jurisdictions in this category use notice-and-comment rulemaking
procedures. 219 None, however, has an express avenue for
outsiders to petition for rule changes. 220 While a handful of

217. FLA. SUP. CT. BAR ADMISSION R. 1-12.
218. Telephone Interview with Jharonte James, Office Receptionist, Fla. Supreme
Court Clerk (Mar. 16, 2016).
219. CAL. STATE BAR R. 1.10(a); Adopted & Proposed Rule Changes, COLO. JUD.
BRANCH, https:// www.courts.state.co.us /Courts /Supreme_Court /Rule_Changes.cfm
[https://perma.cc/9HL4-VG7T]; Standing Comm. on Rules and Procedure, Proposed Rules
Changes and Recent Rules Orders, MD. CTS., http:// www.mdcourts.gov /rules
/ruleschanges.html; TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 82.003(a), 551.001, .041, 2001.003(7), .023,
.029 (West 2017); Requests for Public Comment, W. VA. JUDICIARY, http://
www.courtswv.gov /legal-community /requests- for- comment.html [https://perma.cc/9C2JBCCA]; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 16-3-5.1 (West 2017); HAW. SUP. CT. R. 17(g); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 602.4202(1) (West 2017); Rules Adopted by the Supreme Court, KAN. JUD. BRANCH,
http://www.kscourts.org /rules /default.asp [https://perma.cc/632S-VZRC]. Rule Changes &
Invitations to Comment, MASS. CT. SYS., http:// www.mass.gov /courts /case-legal-res
/rules-of-court/rule-changes-invitations-comment/ [https://perma.cc/84AA-EBTL]; MICH.
CT. R. 1.201(A); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 610.010(4), .011 (West 2017); Advisory Comm. on the
Unif.
Bar
Examination,
Overview,
NY
STATE
UNIFIED
CT.
SYS.,
http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/bar-exam/ [https://perma.cc/9CV9-X8CA]; Proposed Rule
Amendments,
SUP.
CT.
OF
OHIO
&
OHIO
JUD.
SYS.,
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/RuleAmendments/
[https://perma.cc/BE7P-E5MB];
Public Notice and Opportunity to Comment Relative to Proposed Rules or Changes in Rules,
Vt. Admin. Order No. 11, §§ 2-3 (effective Apr. 18, 2003); PA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 103(a); Court
of Appeals Notices, D.C. CTS., https://www.dccourts.gov/court-of-appeals/about-courtappeals/notices [https://perma.cc/55T6-ZN7E].
220. See supra note 180.
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questionable jurisdictions regularly hold meetings that are open
to the public, most do not. 221

3. Insufficient
Jurisdictions were characterized as “insufficient” when their
lawyer-licensing entities did not promulgate rules using a
framework of procedural safeguards.
More specifically,
jurisdictions with insufficient rulemaking procedures and
transparency practices do not provide advance notice of proposed
changes to rules before exercising the authority to change baradmission rules. In addition, insufficient lawyer-licensing
entities do not solicit public comment for a period of time after
publication of proposed changes and before taking official action
in making rule changes. Jurisdictions falling within the
“insufficient” category do not have an express avenue instructing
outsiders how to petition for rule changes. While some of these
jurisdictions may publish public minutes of prior meetings, they
typically do not post meeting agendas in advance. 222 As with
questionable jurisdictions, a handful of insufficient jurisdictions
hold meetings that are open to the public, but most do not. 223 The
221. Compare CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 6026.5(a), .7 (West 2017); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 24-6-402(1)(d)(I), (2)(a) (West 2017); MD. CODE. ANN., GEN. PROVISIONS
§ 3-101(e)(3), (h)(1)-(2), -102 to -103 (West 2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § 18
(West 2017); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-25-1 (West 2017); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§§ 82.003(a), 551.002 (West 2017); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 6-9A-1, -2(7) (West 2017), with
D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-574(3)(B) (West 2017); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 92-1, -2, -6(a)(1)
(West 2017); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 21.1, .2(1)(a),(c) (West 2017); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 75-4318(a) (West 2017); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 100, 102, 108 (McKinney 2017); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 312(e) (West 2017); In re the “Sunshine Law”, 255 N.W.2d 635, 636
(Mich. 1977); In re 42 PA. C. S. § 1703, 394 A.2d 444, 446-47 (Pa. 1978); discussion of
Ohio, South Carolina, and Tennessee law, supra note 194.
222. See, e.g., Board of Bar Commissioners: Board Minutes, ALA. STATE BAR, https://
www.alabar.org
/about-the-bar
/board-of-bar-commissioners
/board-minutes/
[https://perma.cc/C2VZ-82CP]; Board of Bar Commissioners: Upcoming Meeting Dates,
ALA. STATE BAR, https:// www.alabar.org /about-the-bar /board-of-bar-commissioners
/upcoming-meeting-dates/ [https://perma.cc/TD4Z-ECW5]; Board of Law Examiners,
MICH. CTS., http://courts.mi.gov /courts /michigansupremecourt /ble /pages /default.aspx
[https://perma.cc/J2CK-C62V] (failing to indicate meeting dates, agendas, or minutes).
223. Compare 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 120/1, /1.02 (West 2017); Ill. Att’y Gen. Op.
99-005 (Mar. 15, 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 143-318.10(a)-(b) (West 2017); OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 192.610(4), .620, .690 (West 2017); Or. Att’y Gen. Op. 2014-02 (Dec. 10,
2014); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 19.81, .82(1) (West 2017); MINN. BAR ADMISSION R. 3(C)(1),
with ALA. CODE § 36-25A-2(4)(b) (West 2017); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 25-19-103(6), -106(a)
(Supp. 2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10002(h) (West 2017); Del. Att’y Gen. Op. 07-

654

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 70:3

following constitute insufficient jurisdictions: Idaho, Illinois,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Washington, Alabama,
Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Nevada, Rhode Island, Wyoming, and New Jersey.
Oregon provides an example of an insufficient jurisdiction.
In Oregon, the power to promulgate bar-admission rules resides
with the Oregon Supreme Court. 224 A Board of Bar Examiners
committee, whose members are appointed by the supreme court,
may recommend to the court rules governing the qualifications,
requirements and procedures for admission to the bar by
examination or otherwise. 225 In addition to the Board of Bar
Examiners serving in an advisory role, the Board of Governors of
the Oregon State Bar has authority, subject to supreme court
approval, to adopt procedural rules regarding its investigatory
powers with respect to bar admission. 226 No evidence suggests
that either the Supreme Court of Oregon or the Board of Bar
Examiners uses notice-and-comment procedures when adopting
or recommending rule changes. 227 In addition to having no
procedural process with respect to rulemaking initiated from
within the judicial branch, no evidence suggests that there is any
avenue to petition for change from outside the judicial branch. 228
Furthermore, none of the authorities examined for the Oregon
Supreme Court, the Board of Bar Examiners, or the Board of
Governors of the Oregon State Bar contains an express provision

IB02 (Feb. 1, 2007); Del. Att’y Gen. Op. 95-I001 (Jan. 18, 1995); Del. Op. Att’y Gen. 96IB03 (Jan. 2, 1996); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 74-202(4)(a) (West 2017); LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 42:13(A)(3), :17(B) (West 2017); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 25-41-3(a)(i) (West 2017); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 10:4-8(a) (West 2017); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5 § 14, tit. 25 § 304(1) (West
2017); 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 42-46-3, -5(c) (West 2017); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-4402(ii), -403 (West 2017); Fathers are Parents Too, Inc. v. Hunstein, 415 S.E.2d 322, 323
(Ga. Ct. App. 1992); Goldberg v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Court in & for Clark Cty., 572 P.2d 521,
521-22 (Nev. 1977); discussion of Kentucky law supra note 194.
224. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9.210 (West 2017); OR. BAR. R. 1.2.
225. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9.210(1) (West 2017); OR. BAR R. 1.2.
226. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9.542(1) (West 2017).
227. See generally OR. ST. BD. OF BAR EXAM’RS, RULES FOR ADMISSION OF
ATTORNEYS (Rev. Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.osbar.org/_docs/rulesregs/admissions.pdf
[https://perma.cc/924K-S6ZB].
228. Id.
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allowing parties who are substantially affected by the rules to seek
clarification through a declaratory relief mechanism. 229
Another example of an “insufficient” jurisdiction is
Alabama. In Alabama, the power to promulgate rules relating to
the licensing of lawyers resides with the Board of Commissioners
of the State Bar. 230 The Board of Commissioners holds the power
in Alabama “[t]o determine, by rules, the qualifications and
requirements for admission to the practice of law.” 231 The Board
of Examiners, a subordinate entity the Commissioners were
directed to create, 232 possesses its own authority to adopt rules
“governing the control, methods, and details of conducting
examinations.” 233

VI. CONCLUSION
This study has measured the use of rulemaking procedures
and transparency practices of lawyer-licensing entities across
United States jurisdictions. The research shows a lack of
uniformity as to which branch of government, i.e. who, has the
power to regulate lawyer-licensing entities. Presented findings
also include observations about a lack of uniformity in the way
that lawyer-licensing entities exercise rulemaking authority.
Confusion as to who and by what procedures rules are to be
promulgated contributes to a lack of transparency incompatible
with the American democratic ideal. In addition to widespread
variation, a substantial number of lawyer-licensing entities do not
exercise rulemaking authority under procedural-process rules that

229. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9.542 (West 2017); OR. BAR R. 1.2; OR. ST. BD. OF
BAR EXAM’RS, RULES FOR ADMISSION OF ATTORNEYS (Rev. Aug. 1, 2017),
https://www.osbar.org/_docs/rulesregs/admissions.pdf [https://perma.cc/924K-S6ZB].
230. ALA. CODE § 34-3-2, -40(a), -43(a)(1) (West 2017) (establishing the Board of
Commissioners as the governing body of the Alabama State Bar).
231. ALA. CODE § 34-3-43(a)(1) (West 2017) (delineating the powers of the Board of
Commissioners and expressly providing it the power “[t]o determine, by rules, the
qualifications and requirements for admission to the practice of law”).
232. ALA. CODE § 34-3-2 (West 2017) (“The Board of Commissioners . . . shall
provide for a Board of Examiners on Admission to the State Bar and may prescribe rules and
regulations governing the [examining board’s] . . . authority . . . .”).
233. ALA. BAR ADMISSION R. VI(B)B(2) (“The Board of Bar Examiners shall have
the right, power, and authority to adopt rules consistent with the laws of the State of Alabama
or orders of the Supreme Court or the Board of Bar Commissioners governing the control,
methods, and details of conducting examinations”).
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are frequently used by other occupational licensing agencies. 234
Lack of notice-and-comment procedures in several jurisdictions
deprives both lawyers and the public of an ideal democratic
process.
Furthermore, most jurisdictions lack petition
procedures, and not even one jurisdiction offers a declaratory
relief procedure. 235 A lack of these procedures results in a system
that prevents outsiders—outsiders who are still valid
stakeholders—from taking part in the essential process of lawyerlicensing regulation. Additionally, some jurisdictions appear to
carry out administrative tasks behind closed doors. 236 This
practice hampers meaningful communication and hinders the
creation and refinement of appropriate regulation. In today’s
globalized and digital world, the legal profession is facing
increasing demands for change in the way that legal services are
delivered. 237 Changes like these deserve thoughtful consideration
and meaningful participation from the public.
I recommend that all lawyer-licensing entities exercise the
power to promulgate rule changes regarding who may be licensed
as a lawyer, but only under a framework that allows for advance
notice of changes and an opportunity to comment on those
changes. With twenty-six jurisdictions now using the Uniform
Bar Exam, remaining jurisdictions are pressed to consider the
issue. 238 Alterations in such lawyer-licensing rules can change
who becomes an attorney and where they practice. As attorneys,
these individuals will go forth to represent individual members of
the public and, often, the public at large. Thus, for decisions such
as adopting a different method of examining lawyers, all voices
should be heard. Put simply, notice-and-comment opportunities
for the public are particularly essential to the proper functioning
of our justice system.

234. See supra note 36 and section IV.
235. See supra note 180.
236. See supra note 190.
237. See John O. McGinnis & Russell G. Pearce, The Great Disruption: How Machine
Intelligence Will Transform the Role of Lawyers in the Delivery of Legal Services, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 3041, 3041 (2014) (describing the potential effects of automation on the
practice of law); Andrew M. Perlman, Towards the Law of Legal Services, 37 CARDOZO L.
REV. 49, 87-88 (2015) (noting the increasing number of non-lawyer legal service providers).
238. Jurisdictions That Have Adopted the UBE, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF BAR
EXAM’RS, http://www.ncbex.org/exams/ube/ [https://perma.cc/JJS4-AGGK].
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Finally, the lack of uniformity among jurisdictions
demonstrates that there is no single way to effectively accomplish
lawyer-licensing schemes. Moreover, the variation across
jurisdictions demonstrates that a judicial branch claiming
exclusive power to regulate the licensing of lawyers is not
essential to its function as a court. To the contrary, an exclusive
claim to regulate may contribute to a lack of adequate oversight
for lawyer-licensing entities such as those that serve as
gatekeepers to the legal profession and the judicial branch of
government. In fact, the judicial branch, as a rule-interpreting
body, is often underequipped to handle rule creation, which is
historically a function of the legislative branch. 239
Regardless of a lawyer-licensing scheme’s precise details,
jurisdictions should work to ensure that their rulemaking
procedures incorporate democratic ideals, such as public
participation in representation. This will ensure that the
profession maintains and promotes its primary goals: protecting
individual rights, promoting the public good, and serving the
public. 240

239. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”); H. John Proud, Right
Decision, Wrong Constitutional Law: Taking the Better Path with Equal Protection
Jurisprudence—Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003), 29 U. DAYTON L. REV. 447,
461 (2004).
240. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
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Appendix
Use of Rulemaking Procedures and Transparency Practices
for Lawyer-Licensing Entities Across Fifty-One United
States Jurisdictions
Jurisdiction
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Total
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of
Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan

Notice &
Comment
33



Petition
14







Declaratory
Open
Relief
Meetings
0
23
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Jurisdiction
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New
Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Notice &
Comment


Petition
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Declaratory
Open
Relief
Meetings


































